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THE FLOW AND UNDERFLOW OF MOTL V. BOYD
THE CONCLUSION
by
A. R. White* and Will Wilsontt
Part I
ANALYSIS OF APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES - USED AND
UNUSED BY THE COURT
N A previous article,' the authors sought to sketch briefly the
physical, economic, governmental and general legal aspects
of the water law problem. The conflicting interests and the com-
plicating factors are many, particularly in a state such as Texas
which has wide variations in rainfall, climate and topography,
and a mixed heritage, applicable to most of its major streams,
of the civil and common law. It was in this setting that Motl v.
Boyd' was decided. While in some respects the decision is a con-
tribution to the literature on the subject of water law, it has had
its flow of confusion and uncertainty with which most lawyers,
engineers and water officials interested in this area of the law are
familiar. With its underflow-those sustaining authorities and
arguments used by the courts-such persons may not be quite
so familiar. It is the purpose of this paper to examine minutely
those authorities as well as others overlooked by the court but
which bear vitally on the issues involved.
In order that the significant issues of the case may be thor-
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oughly understood, it is necessary to set out fully its facts. In
1886 one Nasworthy owned a 914-acre farm riparian to Spring
Creek, a navigable' Texas stream. In that year one Lackey con-
tracted to buy the farm if he could arrange for water to irrigate
it. This arrangement was made by Lackey with one Lee who
owned 160 acres, patented by the state to his remote grantor in
1857, lying riparian to Spring Creek some four miles above the
larger tract. Lee gratuitously authorized Lackey to construct an
impounding dam on his farm and the necessary headgate and
irrigation ditch to convey the water to the 914-acre farm below.
This Lackey did and he and his successors in title, the Motls
being the last, openly and continuously used the water so im-
pounded to irrigate their farm for a period of 35 years. Spring
Creek carried storm waters and nearly continuous flow from
springs. The dam impounded both and both were used for irri-
gation. In 1889 the then irrigator of the 914-acre farm filed the
affidavit necessary to comply with the Irrigation Act of that year.
No issue of any kind arose until the year 1920 when R. W. Boyd
and H. C. White purchased the 160-acre tract on which the dam
was located. This purchase was made with full knowledge of the
presence of the dam and the use being made of it by the Motls.
Boyd and White made a preliminary effort to get the permission
of the Motls to pump water from behind the dam, which effort
was not followed through, and then sought from, and were denied
by, the Board of Water Engineers, permission to appropriate
"storm" waters from the same source. They then installed a pump
and began drawing water from behind the dam to irrigate por-
tions of their 160 acres. The Motls sought and obtained a tempo-
rary injunction against them and on a failure of the court to dis-
solve on motion, Boyd and White appealed. The court of civil
appeals reversed the trial court and a writ of error was granted
by the supreme court.
3 The stream was navigable in accordance with the then applicable Texas statute
which read:
"All lands surveyed for individuals, lying on navigable water courses, shall front one-
half of the square on the water course and the line running at right angles with the gen.
eral course of the stream, if circumstances of lines previously surveyed under the laws
will permit; and all streams, so far as they retain an average width of thirty feet, shall be
considered navigable streams within the meaning hereof, and they shall not be crossed
by the lines of any survey." TEX. Rev. CIv. STAT. (1879) art. 3911. This article has been
brought forward in substantially this form as TEx. Rev. CIv. STAT. (1925) art. 5302.
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The opinion of the court of civil appeals attracted much atten-
tion and numerous briefs on both sides of the lawsuit were filed
in the supreme court by its friends. The case was on file in that
court for four years. The supreme court, in an extensive opinion
by Chief Justice Cureton, reached two major conclusions of inter-
est to us here. First, the court concluded that the original grantees
of all riparian lands in Texas prior to 1895, whether from Spain,
Mexico or Texas, acquired, as a part of their grants, a vested
property right to the use for irrigation of certain of the waters
in the streams to which their lands were then riparian, and that
such right passed by conveyance to subsequent grantees to the
extent that the land of the original grants remained riparian.4
Second, the court held that the long, open, continuous use by
Motl and his predecessors in title of the waters from behind the
dam on the 160-acre tract with the knowledge and acquiesence
of its owners, estopped the latter from questioning in 1920 the
continuance of the practice, and, in effect, constituted a grant
of the riparian rights to Motl and his predecessor in title.' Spe-
cifically it is with these two aspects of the opinion that this paper
deals.
This article consists of Parts I and II. The general plan of
Part 1 is to discuss and analyze the authorities relied on by the
Court to sustain its conclusion on riparian rights including the
modern Texas statutes, the text citations from Hall's Mexican Law,
the statutes of Mexico and Coahuila and Texas and three Texas
cases. The meaning of the laws of Mexico and Coahuila and Texas
will be sought, first, as a matter of pure statutory construction, sec-
ond, in the light of the language used in other related statutes
enacted by the same legislative bodies, and third, in the light of
the contemporaneous practices by those Mexican officials charged
with their administration. The paper will then analyze some early
4 It will be remembered that the term "riparian rights" is commonly used to refer to
a cluster of specific rights, including the right to flow, to fish, to navigate, to use water
for irrigation and for domestic purposes, and the rights of accretion and avulsion. The
nature and extent of the right to use water for irrigation is the only one of these rights
specifically dealt with by the court and in this paper.
5 The holding of the court included two other major points. One was the holding that
the action of the Board of Water Engineers in passing upon an application for a permit
to appropriate water was administrative and not judicial. Another was its holding that
riparian rights attached only to the ordinary flow and underflow of watercourses. These




Texas irrigation statutes substantially ignored by the court and
indicate the bearing it is believed those statutes had, or should
have had, on the water law of our state.
The conclusion drawn in Part I of the paper is that the first
of the two above pronouncements of the court, the one on the
origin, nature and extent of the riparian's rights, is largely er-
roneous dictum. The general plan of Part 1I of the paper is, in
search of the correct conclusion, to trace from their ancient Span-
ish origins the irrigation laws, practices and customs out of which
our early Texas irrigation law grew, and to draw conclusions
therefrom, as to the true state of such law during the time the
great majority of our Texas public lands were granted. Lastly,
the status of Motl v. Boyd as authority will be discussed in the
light of all previous conclusions reached by us.
The exact phraseology of the court's conclusion on riparian
rights is as follows:
That all grantees of public lands became invested, by reason of the
lands granted, with riparian rights to the waters of the streams... Not
only for his (their) domestic and household use but for irrigation as
well.6
The whole tenor of the opinion makes it clear that the court
by the term "all grantees of public lands" meant only as well as
all grantees of public lands riparian to streams of watercourses.
Do the authorities relied on by the court sustain the conclusion
reached? It is submitted that they do not, but, on the contrary,
that such conclusion is neither the most reasonable nor the most
logical one, nor even the one most strongly indicated by the au-
thorities and practices existing at the time of the grants.
Let us now examine the statutory authority on which the court
relied. One such group of statutes were those enacted on and
after 1879 regulating the sale of the public lands of Texas.7 Gen-
erally speaking, these statutes took into consideration the rela-
tionship of public lands to a permanent water supply in classify-
ing them for the purposes of price or the amount of land which
any one person would be allowed to buy. Little need be said of
0 Motyl v. Boyd, 106 Tex. 82, 286 S. W. 458, 467 (1926).
7 See discussion 286 S. W. at 466.467. These statutes should not be confused with the
Texas irrigation statutes discussed in/ra.
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,these statutes. The primary justification for not doing so is the
fact that they were not in existence in 1857 when the 160-acre
tract of land involved in Motl v. Boyd was patented by the state.
,Consequently they could have no direct bearing on the issues
:involved in that case and probably little, if any, indirect bearing.
A reading of them, however, discloses that they do not refer to
irrigation. That such statutes have no significance on the point
,of the riparian's right to water for irrigation is illustrated by the
fact that after Texas by statutes in 1889' and 1895' had declared
,certain waters in certain areas of the state to be the property of
-the public and available for appropriation, subject only to the
rights of riparians to waters for domestic use, the state continued
'to provide for taking into consideration in classifying and evaluat-
:ing its public land the relationship of such land to "streams and
.other sources of water supply."'" But of more significance still
is the fact that during the period covered by these statutes there
,were Texas statutes in effect dealing specifically with irrigation
'which were completely ignored by the court, and which were more
directly pertinent in ascertaining the state's statutory policy on
irrigation. The first of these statutes was enacted in 1852," and,
;as a later analysis of them will demonstrate, they have never spe-
,cifically recognized any right in a riparian to waters for irriga-
;tion superior to that of a nonriparian, and that through 1895 their
language was inconsistent with the existence of such right.
Another source of authority relied upon by the court was Hall's
Mexican Law from which it quoted as follows:
Waters which are not nor cannot be private property belong to the
public. Such were the waters of the rivers which by themselves or by
accession with others follow their courses to the sea. These may be
navigable or not navigable. If they are navigable, nobody can avail
himself of them so as to hinder or embarrass navigation; but if they
are not, the owners of the land through which they pass may use the
waters thereof for the utility of their farms or their industry.'12
The court, in the paragraph above quoted, does not include all
8 Act 21st Leg. §§ 1.2 at 100.
9 Thx. REV. CIv. STAT. (1895) art. 3115. See also arts. 3117 and 3124.
10 Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1895) art. 4218e.
11 Acts. 4th Leg. at 80; 3 GAMMEL's LAWS OF TEx. at 958.
12 HALL, MEXICAN LAW Art. 1388 (1895).
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of Art. 1388 of Hall. An important qualification on the use by
adjoining owners reads as follows:
Without prejudice to the common use or destiny which the towns on
their course shall have given them, and with the modifications pro-
vided in the laws, orders, and decrees which are spoken of under the
word "Acequia." Who, how, and when they can fish in the waters
which belong to the public will be seen under the word "fish" (pesca).
The portion quoted by the court plus the omitted portion indi-
cated is in every material respect an exact reproduction of Es-
criche's Diccionario, Title "Agua," sub-topic 111, "Public
Waters. ' ' 12a It should be noted that:
1. Escriche and Hall in this paragraph were discussing "Pub-
lic Waters," which, by their own definition, would seem to in-
clude practically all of the water available for irrigation.
2. No use could be made of such waters from navigable
streams that would embarrass navigation.
3. If such waters were not in navigable streams, they were
first subject to whatever use the extensive towns of that day might
see fit to make of them.' Apparently this would be true of waters
in navigable streams to the extent such waters could be used for
irrigation.
4. That all uses, apparently of riparians and nonriparians
alike, were subject to further orders, laws, and decrees. This is
substantially inconsistent with the riparian having a vested prop-
erty right in the waters for irrigation.
A second paragraph quoted from Hall by the court is as fol-
lows:
If running water passes between estates of different owners, each one
of these can use it for the irrigation of his estate or for any other object,
but not the whole of it, but only the part which corresponds to him,
because both have equal rights, and the one can consequently oppose
the use of it all by the other, or even a part considerably more than his
own.
14
12* The edition of Escriche used is that of Libreria de Garnier Hermanos, Paris
(1896).
13 The town holdings or terminos, were frequently extended regions of country in
the olden time, and 'there was a great deal of municipal law regulating the use of
water....' HALL, ICRIGATION DEvELOPMENT 370 (1885). This Hall is not the same as
the Hall who compiled the Mexican law from which the court quoted.
14 HALL, MEXICAN LAW Art. 1391 (1885).
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The above quoted paragraph is a reproduction of Escriche's
Diccionario, Title, "Aqua," sub-topic IV, paragraph three.15 A
correct understanding of this paragraph can be had, however,
only if we consider the introductory paragraph to subtopic IV
of Escriche which is carried identically by Hall as Art. 1389.
It reads:
Municipal Law... The use of the running waters which requires a
license which are not of those which anybody can avail himself without
a license from the authority, must be regulated by the provisions of the
municipal ordinances, or by the uses and customs of the country; but
in default of ordinances and customs, equity and the interest of agri-
culture indicate the following rules...
It should be noted concerning this introductory paragraph that:
1. It announces Escriche's rules, of which Art. 1391 was one,
based on his sense of equity concerning non public waters which
required a license. Rivers by definition in Title 111 are public
and therefore are taken out of this category.
2. Such waters are subject first, to municipal ordinances;
second, to "the uses and customs of the country," and it is only
when those do not control that Escriche's rules conceived in equity
are to apply.
Consequently, the second paragraph quoted by the court from
Hall applies to the use of non public, non-navigable waters to
which no municipal ordinances or uses and customs were applica-
ble. It is a gross misuse of the article to take it out of context and
out of the general Spanish irrigation pattern and make it broadly
applicable to the whole river system of Texas.
It was noted above that the quoted articles from Hall are sim-
ply translations of corresponding portions of Escriche's Title,
"Aqua.""6 If Hall comes from Escriche, from what source does
Escriche on this subject come? It has been said that his statements
"seem to have been very largely his own views ... founded on
French [rather] than on Spanish law" and that his according to
15 This subtopic beading in Escriche reads: "Of the Use of the Waters which Pass
Along the Border of or Through an Estate." These streams are commonly referred to as
"small streams." HALL, IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT (1885).
10 Mr. Neal King, an attorney in Mission, Texas, has stated in an unpublished writ-
ing that Arts. 1368-1400 of HALL, MEXICAN LAW (1885) is nothing more than a trans-
lation of Escriche's entire title, "Aqua."
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"all riparian proprietors on small streams an equal right of ser-
vitude to the waters, [is] the French law, but for which I find
no sufficient authority in the old Spanish laws."17 So at best, the
quotations from Hall can have only very limited significance to
a consideration of our Texas irrigation problem.
If we analyze the quotations from Hall from another point of
view, it seems apparent that they provide us little assistance in
the solution of our crucial problem. Except under the old common
law rule that a riparian was entitled to have waters flow by his,
land as nature provided, undiminished in quantity or quality,
there has existed little question that riparians, in the absence of
contrary government regulations, could use the waters of adjoin-
ing streams and that such right or privilege of use, as the case
might be, was correlative in nature. That is no more than a state-
ment of the privilege that any citizen has to enjoy similar public
properties held by the state for the common benefit of all its
citizens. And the waters in the Indies, which included Texas, were
public under Spanish law. A decree of the Spanish Crown pro-
vided: "We have ordained that.., waters, shall be common in
the Indies."" s What was meant by "common" is revealed by Art-
23 of such laws and decrees which reads:
We hereby declare, that the wild fruits be common, and that everyone
may gather them, and carry away the plants to place them within their
improvements and estates."9
So if the quotations from Hall are fully accepted they throw only
faint light on the relative status of the riparian's claim to water
for irrigation as compared to that of any other citizen who might
legally get access to the waters, or on the character of the
riparian's right or privilege in the face of efforts of the state to
distribute its waters among its citizens generally.
The principal foundation, however, on which the court rested
its conclusion appears to be the particular phraseology of the
early colonization laws of Mexico and Texas and Coahuila. Since
17 HALL, IRRIGATION DEVFLOPMENT 382 (1885). "Escriche's Diccionario of Spanish
law is, upon the subject of waters, not much more than a commentary upon the Code
Napoleon...." Wiel, The Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Water-
courses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 256 (1918).
18 Art. 22, Laws and Decrees of Spain, 1 Sayles' Early Laws of Texas at 26.
19 Sayles Early Laws of Texas at 27.
[Vol.9
WATER RIGHTS
these laws are crucial to the question under consideration, their
relevant parts as quoted by the court are here fully set out. Art.
6 of the Mexican Colonization law of 1823 reads:
In the distribution made by government, of lands to the colonists, for
the formation of villages, towns, cities, and provinces, a distinction shall
be made between grazing lands, destined for the raising of stock, and
lands suitable for farming or planting, on account of the facility of
irrigation.20
On March 18, 1824, the central Mexican government adopted
a decree which authorized the Mexican states, subject to certain
limitations, to distribute the lands within their jurisdictions. Art.
12 of the decree, which contains one of those limitations, reads
as follows:
It shall not be permitted to unite in the same .hands with the right of
property, more than one league square of land, suitable for irrigation,
four square leagues in superfices, of arable land without the facilities
of irrigation, and six square leagues in superficies of grazing land. 21
21 As quoted by the court, 286 S. W. 464. Italics supplied by the court.
Pursuant to the authority contained in Art. 12 of the central
government statute Texas and Coahuila, on March 24, 1825,
decreed:
Art. 12. Taking the above unity as a basis, and observing the distinc-
tion which must be made between grazing land, or that which is proper
for raising of stock, and farming land, with or without the facility of
irrigation; this law grants to the contractor or contractors, for the
establishment of a new settlement, for each hundred families which he
may introduce and establish in the State, five sitios of grazing land, and
five labors at least, the one-half of which, shall be without the facility
of irrigation, but they can only receive this premium for eight hundred
families, although a greater number should be introduced, and no frac-
tion whatever, less than one hundred, shall entitle them to any premium,
not even proportionately. (Emphasis added.)
Art. 22. The new settlers as an acknowledgment, shall pay to the state,
for each sitios of pasture land, thirty dollars; two dollars and a half
for each labor without the facility of irrigation, and three dollars and
a half for each one that can be irrigated, and so on proportionately ac-
cording to the quantity and quality of the land distributed.. 22
2OAs quoted in Mot v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 100; 286 S. W. 458, 463 (1926). Italics
supplied by the court.
22 Ibid. Italics supplied by the court.
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The court by no means exhausted the materials containing such
phraseology. Elsewhere in the laws of Coahuila and Texas are
to be found similar expressions concerning Texas lands. We find
"irrigable tillage land" and "not irrigable" in Art. 12 of Decree
No. 16 of the Constituent Congress of Coahuila and Texas; 3
"Not irrigable" and "is irrigable" in Art 22 of such decree,2'
and the terms, "tillage land, not irrigable" and "irrigable tillage
land" in Art. 24 thereof.25 In Art. 10 of Decree No. 9 of the
Constitutional Congress of Coahuila and Texas we find the term,
"for cultivation, irrigable or not irrigable" ;26 in Art. 2 of Decree
No. 62 of such laws the term, "labor of irrigable land" ;27 in Art.
14 of Decree 190, the term "tillage land, not irrigable" ;21 in Art.
15 of such Decree the term "tillage land, not irrigable" also ap-
pears.2 9
Note precisely the terminology used. Nowhere is the word "ri-
parian" used, although it was well known to the civil law. The
total absence will be noted of such words and phrases as "adjoin-
ing," "along," "bordering on," "adjacent to," etc.
In no one of these laws or decrees dealing with irrigation was
any term used suggesting that the right to water for irrigation was
to be confined to riparian lands. If by the use of such terms as
"irrigable," "suitable for irrigation," or "facility for irrigation,"
the lawmakers intended to say all land, and only lands, "along,"
"fronting on," "adjoining," "bordering on," or "riparian to"
rivers and streams, it seems fair to observe that it was a quaint
and obscure way of saying it. It becomes all the more difficult to
believe that they so meant when we realize that the language from
the decrees above quoted was not the language of one person,
written at one time, to whose idiosyncracy the language used can be
attributed; but it was the language of a Congress composed of
many men, and of succeeding Congresses in which we can reason-
ably assume there was some turn over of personnel. If these
23 Laws and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas at 17 (1839).
24 Id. at 19.
25 Ibid.
26 Id. at 71.
27 Id. at 106.
28 Id. at 190.
29 Id. at 191.
80 Wiel, supra, note 17 at 251.
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Congresses had meant what the court concluded they meant,
surely someone in all this host of men would have realized, and
would have called the attention of Congress to the fact, that they
were expressing themselves most awkwardly.
It becomes unbelievable that this ambiguous method of expres-
sion was used to mean all riparian and only riparian land when
we observe that some of the Congresses involved were quite fa-
miliar with a more exact phraseology for expressing the riparian
concept, and could aptly use it when it conveyed what they wished
to say. For example Art. 29 of Decree No. 190 of the Laws and
Decrees of Coahuila and Texas reads:
The survey of vacant lands that shall be made upon the borders of any
river, running rivulet or creek, or lake, shall not exceed one fourth of
the depth of the land granted, should the land permit.81
And Art. 22 of Decree No. 272 of such Laws and Decrees reads:
"Lands fronting on permanent creeks, rivers, large lakes, bays and the
sea shore, shall run back double the extent of their front.' 2 (Emphasis
added.)
From the foregoing it seems to be too clear for argument that
as a matter of pure statutory construction, the use of such terms
as "irrigable," "suitable for irrigation," and "facility of irriga-
tion" in those very early land laws did not mean, and was not
intended to mean, all lands, and lands only, riparian to rivers,
streams and similar water sources.
If there is any doubt on this matter as one of pure construc-
tion, it should be dispelled when we contemplate the topography
along our Texas rivers and other streams. It is common knowledge
that much of the land riparian to the Rio Grande, the Pecos, the
Colorado and some other of our Texas rivers and streams is not
"irrigable" even now, as a practical matter, by any stretch of the
imagination. It was much less so at the time such lands were
granted in view of the fact that gravity flow was depended upon
almost entirely to get water from its source onto the lands to be
irrigated. It seemed to be a common practice of the Spanish and
Mexican governments to lay out lands so as to get as many own-
s' Laws and Decrees of Coahuila and Texas at 192 (1839).
82 1d. at 250.
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erships as possible on watercourses whether the land was or was
not regarded as irrigable. The most striking example of this prac-
tice are the porciones along the Rio Grande. These Spanish grants
were of long, narrow strips of land fronting for approximately
one mile on the river, but extending away from it for a distance
of eight or ten miles. None of these examined was classified as
irrigable.3
That some of such riparian lands were not regarded as irrigable
by the Mexican lawmakers themselves is borne out by other laws
enacted by them. Frequently, as in Art. 12 of Decree No. 16 of
the Constituent Congress of Coahuilo and Texas 4 the terms "graz-
ing lands" and "irrigable tillage lands" were used to show the
Congress was drawing a sharp distinction between the two. It is
meaningful then when we find Art. 1 of Decree No. 320 of the
Constitutional Congress of Texas reading in part: "In sitios of
grazing land upon the opposite sides of Rio Bravo, of which the
crossing called Pacuache, on the road leading to Bexar, shall be
the center are hereby granted ... "" (Emphasis added.) Here
the authority relied on by the court in Mod v. Boyd, the Mexi-
can Congress, to show that "irrigable" lands meant all granted
lands along our watercourses, itself made a specific grant of land
bordering on the Rio Grande which is exactly to the contrary and
decisively shows it held no such view.
It is also of equally common knowledge that much land along
many of our Texas rivers which is not, and never has been ri-
parian, is highly "suitable for irrigation."36
What is done under any law by its contemporaries who are
charged with the responsibility for its administration is highly
significant in ascertaining its meaning. We therefore turn to the
administration of the colonization laws construed by the supreme
court in the Mot case to see what those contemporaneous with
their enactment, and immediately charged with the responsibility
as See inlra, text and notes at 415-422.
34 Laws and decrees of Coahuila and Texas at 17 (1839).
85 Id. at 307. Rio Bravo is one of the names by which the Mexicans called the Rio
Grande.
36 For illustrations, see 1955 applications on file with the Texas State Board of Water
Engineers of Hidalgo County Water Control and Improvement District No. 15 and the
South Texas Canal Company. Much of the land involved in the latter application is out-
side the watershed of the proposed source of supply.
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of their administration, interpreted them to mean by their official
actions.
Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821. The
colonization laws construed by the court were enacted by the
Mexican government following its independence. It should be
helpful, however, in understanding what the Mexicans did to
examine the land grant practices of the Spaniards before them.
The Spaniards and the Mexicans after them, classified the lands
granted by the state into three major categories. One was "irri-
gable land," or land with the "facilities of irrigation."37 a second
category of lands was "temporal" or arable lands which were
those suitable for farming though dependent only on natural rain-
fall. The third category was "Agostadero" or pasture lands. These
were regarded as suited primarily for use as pasture for some
type of livestock.
Only twenty-three Spanish grants have been examined. One in
Nacogdoches County, was classified as: "It has running water for
irrigation."3 " All of the remainder were classified, though on
rivers or streams, as either arable or pasture land, or in some
cases, the same grant would be classified as having lands of each
of these categories.8 9 The Concepcion de Carricitos Grant" made
by the government of Spain in 1780 consisted of in excess of
twelve leagues of land bordering on the lower Rio Grande River,
but it was all classified as "pasture land". In 1790 proceedings
were had preliminary to, and involving the granting of the Llano
Grande and La Feria Grante.4' The former is located in what is
now Hidalgo County and the latter in what is now Cameron County.
Both of these grants had extended frontage on the Rio Grande.
The proceedings involved the taking of testimony of persons fa-
miliar with such lands and the purposes for which it was adapted
37 As a matter of pure definition it would seem that the two terms have different
meaning, but a reading of hundreds of classification statements by the officials of the
two governments does not reveal any basis for giving the two terms separate and distinct
meaning.
88 Vol. 37, at 201, Spanish Archives, General Land Office, State of Texas.
35 Fourteen of the twenty-three Spanish grants examined were in Nacogdoches
County; three were in Angelina County; and five were in the Rio Grande Valley.
40 Book A at 160, Real Estate Records, Cameron County, Texas.
41 These proceedings are recorded in Vol. X (letter) 10-105, Supplemental Deed
Records, Cameron County, Texas.
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in order that it might be properly classified. One Domingo Guerra
testified that
the center of said Agostadero as well as all of its borders are overgrown
with thick woods and have many brakes very brisy ... all of said lands
are very well adapted to the raisings and caring of stock of all species
because they are covered with an abundance of pasturage, water and
wood and repredos and they cannot be used for other purposes on ac-
count of the risk of inundation already referred to.
... that said Rio Grande river is where the cattle and horse stock get
water.... Being asked if these lands or any part of them were suitable
for farming, he answered and: that based on the experience that he has
had with them, they are not perfectly adapted for farming by reason
of the fact.., that during the winter they cannot be farmed because
on account of the passing of the water over them, a certain baking and
a hardening of the surface takes place which will not permit the seed
to sprout, and also the lack of water for irrigating at that time, and it
being impossible to take the water out of said river, esteros or lagoons .42
(Emphasis added)
A second witness, one Jose Matias Tijerina similarly testified
that
... they are lands very appropriate for breeding as they have a great
deal of pasture and good protection and cannot serve for any other
thing .... that the cattle and horse stock generally water at the Rio
Grande .... besides the lack of water for irrigating purposes at such
times impede it, and it is impossible to take it out of the river, esteros
or lagunas, there being many obstacles to prevent it.4 (Emphasis
added.)
The judge of the proceedings, Jose Antonio de la Garza Falcon,
assisted by Salvador Salamea and Ygnacio Anastacio de Ayala,
made a personal inspection
... and examined those lands to see whether they were good for farm-
ing.., we found that they were not entirely good for sowing because
the land was not adapted thereto, nor did they possess any irrigation,
nor could they be irrigated from any of the places where there is water,
nor do they possess any other benefit, and they are only good at times
for the breeding of all classes of stock.44 (Emphasis added.)
This same opinion of the lands generally along the Rio Grande
was shared by a gentleman very prominent in Texas history,
42 Id. at 19.
481d. at 21.
44 Id. at 28.
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Stephen F. Austin. In a letter written by him in 1829 to his
cousin, Captain Henry Austin, he made this observation:
As regards the country on the Rio Grande, so far as my information
extends it is calculated entirely for pastoral purposes and can never be
valuable as an agricultural section. The soil is rich and fertile, but the
seasons are dry and so very irregular as to destroy everything like cer-
tainty in crops, unless where there are facilities for irrigation, and these
can only be obtained by means of machinery for raising the water out
of the river-an expedient which would be expensive and I think inade.
quate-tho many have had it on contemplation, as I have been told, to
use of steam for this purpose.45 (Emphasis added.)
Moving from deep South to deep East Texas, we find that in
1810 Vincente Michelli received a confirmation to the lands now
comprising the Vincente Michelli Survey on both sides of the
Angelina River in Angelina and Nacogdoches Counties. The in-
vestigator appointed by the governor, in addition to revealing
that the lands were not regarded as "suitable for irrigation," in-
formed us that some of our current East Texas pests have an
ancient and robust ancestry. He reported, "It has good pasture
the whole year round, very good soil for farming, water only in
the Angelina River, but not suitable for irrigation-it is well
timbered land; it is liable to the epidemic of horse flies, mosquitos,
gallinipers and other insects interfering with cattle raising."4
(Emphasis added.)
The grants made by the Mexican state of Coahuila and Texas
are numerous and available for inspection though primarily still
in Spanish. We examined the classification statements of in excess
45 As quoted in HORGAN, THE GREAT RrvE, 482 (1954). In 1767 experts appointed
in connection with the classification and granting of the Carmago porciones along the
Rio Grande stated that the lands were "without irrigation or special distinction and here
they have tried to take water." It appears that an irrigation ditch had been dug from
the San Juan river but that the water ran down it a short way and disappeared. Copy and
Translations of Charter "Visita General" granting Carmago Porcions, 194, 197, Spanish
Archives, General Land Office, State of Texas. Similarly experts in the same year indi-
cated the Mier Porciones of Starr County were not irrigable and indicated that the
watering of cattle was the reason for having all such porciones front on the river. They
said "No irrigation except as may be detailed at occurence of storms ... that a watering
place at the river be given to everyone, otherwise the cattle will certainly perish and the
porciones of lands become useless." Copy and translation of Charter "Visita General"
granting Mier Porciones at 163-164, Spanish Archives, General Land Office, State of
Texas.
46 Vol. 37 at 385, Spanish Archives, General Land Office, State of Texas.
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of 750 of the grants.47 With very limited exceptions, all of these
grants. fronted or bordered on our rivers or other major Texas
streams.
Of those bordering on our watercourses, but not on an irriga-
tion ditch, 26 received no classification; one was classified in this
language,
There are on the Geronimo a considerable quantity of lands subject to
irrigation-say ten labors of richest lands and twenty-five labors with-
out the facility of irrigation-making on the whole thirty-five labors4s
and the remainder, a number in excess of 700, or approximately
ninety-five per cent, were all classified, though bordering on a river
or other stream, either as arable or pasture land. For examples
the grant in 1835 to Wm. D. Benham was described as being
"situated on left bank of Frio River-One-third league of pas-
ture which includes our labor of arable."49 The grant in 1827
to David Hamilton was described and classified as "situated on
Peach Creek and along the west side of the San Bernado without
the facility of irrigation."5 The grant of two leagues of land
made in 1824 to Alexander Jackson was described and classified
as "On the Colorado River, both without the facilities of irriga-
tion, only with the use of permanent water."'" The grant of eight
leagues fronting on the San Antonio River made in 1834 to the
heirs of Juan and Simon Arocha contained the statement that,
"There are at least fourteen labors of land suitable for cultiva-
tion, but all without the facility of irrigation.""2 On the opposite
bank of the San Antonio river and immediately across from the
Arocha Grant lies the grant of two leagues made in 1834 to Maria
47 The necessity for giving a detailed listing of these grants does not seem to be great
enough to justify the space that would be required to do so. They are available on
request. These grants were distributed as follows: Angelina County, 49; Bexar County,
27; Colorado County, 48; Dewitt County, 48; Goliad County, 54; Guadalupe County,
38; Harris County, 86; Jackson County, 87; Lavaca County, 60; McMullen County, 12;
Matagorda County, 109; Victoria County, 66; Wharton County, 50; Wilson County, 22;
and an undetermined number estimated to be in excess of 50 scattered throughout other
south and east Texas counties.
48 Grant State of Coahuila and Texas to Antonio Maria Esnaurizar, Vol. 28 at 49,
Spanish Archives, General Land Office, State of Texas. Through footnote 56 volume and
page only of these records will be cited.
49 Vol. 59, at 19.
50 Vol. 2, at 552.
51 Vol. 1, at 122.
52 Vol. 3, at 47.
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Calvillo which states that "the tract is all pasture land."5 The
one league of land on the east bank of the Colorado River granted
to Jacob Betts in 1824 was "without the facility of irrigation and
only with the use of permanent waters of the River" 4 as was the
land granted in 1827 on the west bank of the Colorado to John
Crier.55
The fact that the grant was of rich bottom land did not seem
to alter the classification. The description and classification of
the one league of land granted in 1831 to John G. King stated
that "There are about two labors of timbered bottom and prairie
bottom lands fit for cultivation but not having the facility of irri-
gation."56 And the grant made in 1824 to James Cummins states
"One league and one labor of land for rearing cattle without
means of irrigation and only with the use of permanent water
on the east bank of the Colorado River and the labor on the west
"157bank of said river...
The Coahuila and Texas grants examined which were located
off rivers, and not on irrigation ditches, were all classified as
arable or pasture land. Three tracts in Bexar County located off
a river but on an irrigation ditch were granted as irrigable land.
These tracts were originally parts of the old Spanish missions
of San Antonio and were granted to private persons following
the secularization of such missions in the latter part of the eight-
eenth century. The tract granted to Manuel Yturre Carrillo in
1824 was described as being "three sections of 100 varas each
in the abandoned Mission of Conception with 3 days of water.
Limited on the north by the irrigation gate; on the south by the
land of Erasmo Seguin; on the east by the San Juan Road; on
the west by the old Concepcion Mission Road."5" Similarly the
tract granted in 1824 to Jose Maria Escalera got one day of water
though "limited by the Espada Road on the west; on the south
53 Vol. 31, at 75.
54 Vol. 2, at 512.
55 Vol. 2, at 594.
56 Vol. 12, at 27.
57 Book A, at 78-83, Deed Records, Colorado County, Texas. The number of such
grants could be multiplied from those examined, but those selected are on well known
rivers and typical of others that might be set out.







by the lands 'f Juan Martin de Veramendi; on the east by the
drainage ditch and on the north by royal land."59
Still another grant should be mentioned though its classifica-
tion and the reasons given therefor are somewhat ambiguous.
It is the grant to Jose Sandoval the location of which with refer-
ence to the San Antonio River and the Espada irrigation ditch
can be best understood by reference to Map 1 accompanying this
article. 0 It will be noted that the tract borders on the San An-
tonio River, the Espada ditch and Minita Creek. The grant from
Coahuila and Texas states "The tract on the right side of Minita
creek can be considered arable or irrigable because of the ease
with which water can be diverted from the labor of the Mission
through Minita Creek, since Jose Sandoval owns the last suertes
of the Mission lands adjoining this tract."'" We interpret this
language to mean that the portion of Sandoval's grant along the
southwest bank of the San Antonio River and adjoining the Espada
ditch and Minita creek was irrigable because of the ease with
which the water could be brought to this portion of the lands from
the ditch through Minita Creek, while that portion bordering the
northeast bank of the San Antonio River, but not on an irrigation
ditch, was not irrigable. If that interpretation is the correct one,
it seems that the relation to an irrigation ditch-a "facility of
irrigation"-was a more important factor in determining the
irrigability of land by the contemporary administrators of the
colonization laws under consideration than was its proximity to
a river.
Consideration of two other tracts of land in this area may
throw light on this issue. Reference at this point should be made
to Map 2 accompanying this article. The first is the tract of land
59 Vol. C-i, at 202-205, Deed Records, Bexar County, Texas. See also grant to Jose
Antonio Saucedo, Vol. E-1, at 175-181 of such records.
60 Maps 1 and 2 are reproductions of a map obviously of great age found in the files
of the Stewart Title and Guaranty Company Offices, San Antonio, Texas. Its inscription
states that it shows the "Names of the original claimants to the irrigable lands comprised
in the labores of the Missions of Conception, San Jose, San Juan and La Espada, lying
below the City of San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas." The map bears the date of 1874
and was certified to in that year as correct to the best of their knowledge by F. Giraud,
former District Surveyor, Bexar County, Texas; by Sam L. Smith, District Clerk, Bexar
County, Texas; and by L. C. Navarro, District Surveyor, Bexar County, Texas. Designa-
tions have been made in some instances to supply omissions resulting from these maps
being only portions of a larger map.







there shown to belong to "Manuel Yturri" which is believed to
be the off-river-but-on ditch tract described above as granted to
Manuel Yturre Carrillo. 2 It will be recalled that the grant carried
irrigation water rights. The second tract to be noted in this con-
nection is the tract shown on Map 2 as belonging to Jose Gomo
(probably Gomes) and lying along and between the east bank of
the San Antonio River and the Mission Concepcion road which
is indicated by the dotted line. The grant, though on the river
and between the river and a grant which carried water rights, did
not itself receive a grant of water rights or privileges. It was de-
scribed by Gomes as "temporal" land in his application for a
grant.63 While the possibility of error regarding the identity of
the tracts is recognized, it is believed that the great preponderance
of likelihood is that the tracts are as assumed.
The classification of these three tracts when contrasted with
the classification of the more than 750 other tracts hereinabove
described, constitutes strong evidence that the location of land
on a canal, though off any river, had much more to do with it
being regard as "irrigable" or as having the "facilities of irriga-
tion" than did being on a river alone.
In reality the issue of whether a tract of land was "irrigable"
or had the "facilities of irrigation" was one of fact and not a
legal result which automatically followed from the one fact that
a tract of land bordered on a watercourse. This is illustrated by
an experience recorded in 1756. In that year the Spanish govern-
ment explored the possibilities of establishing a settlement on
either the lower Trinity or lower San Jacinto or both. The lengthy
record of the proceedings which took place are on file in the
Nacogdoches Archives, State Library of Texas Archives, Austin,
Texas, under the title "Order to proceed to Survey the Borders
62 It is recognized that there are substantial variations in both names and descrip-
tions. But we were told by a number of persons in the course of our investigation that it
was not at all unusual for there to be two or three versions of the name of the same
Mexican person. And there is some similarity of names and both descriptions are of a
tract in the Concepcion Mission and the one on the map under the name of Manuel
Yturri is the only one in such Mission lands under a name faintly resembling that of
Manuel Yturre Carrillo and which approximately fits the description of that tract.
63 Vol. L-1, at 99-101, Deed Records, Bexar County, Texas.
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of the Trinity River and select the most Convenient Place to
Establish a Settlement of fifty families and a Mission." The ac-
tivities of the expedition are recorded in great detail, but this
extract from the statement of the governor made on September
3, 1756 is indicative of the approach used. He stated that he had
used every possible means to examine closely said spring of water,
which it was found impossible to withdraw, in as much as he had investi-
gated, as much by the large and high hill as by the disproportionateness
of all its terrain, by the heights and depths of it, and that besides this
the surface of the land is too high, which will not fall to ten varas from
the height of the side of the spring of water, by which reason it carries
its course of altitude; and that by reason of his obligation, he not only
has examined what was possible from said spring of water, but that
by its margins it had arrived at the San Jacinto River, where he had
examined closely a withdrawal of water...
So the issue was simply whether there was a supply of water
which, in view of elevation and grade, could be used to irrigate
the lands in the vicinity.
The court, not so much as authority as by way of corroboration
of the conclusion reached by it in construing the colonization
laws, cited three Texas cases. These will be analyzed briefly to
see whether they support the broad conclusion reached by the
court. The first of these cases is Watkins Land Co. v. Clements."
This case, involving land in the arid portion of the state, was a
suit by a lower riparian irrigator to enjoin an upper riparian
irrigator from uses of such extent as to interfere with his original
irrigation practices. It appears that both parties were either using
the waters of the stream involved on nonriparian lands or were
selling it to someone who was doing so. The court squarely held
that waters could not be so diverted to nonriparian lands. The
following observations about the case, however, are pertinent to
the question of the extent of its authority for the broad conclu-
sion reached by the court in the Moil case. All of the lands in-
volved in the Clements case were granted by the State of Texas
64 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733 (1905).
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after 1840. If the limited adoption in 1840 of the common law
as the rule of decision in Texas6" automatically changed the sub-
stantive law of riparian rights, this would mean that the issue
before the court in the Clements case in no way involved the inter-
pretation of Spanish and Mexican law as applied to Texas lands.
Consequently it could hardly be cited as authority for any con-
clusion on riparian rights involving such law. It therefore seems
to follow that the case, at best, could be no authority for the
court's conclusion in the Motl case concerning the nature and
extent of riparian rights under Spanish, Mexican and Coahuila
and Texas grants. It could be only a common law authority, and
affect at best only those grants made in Texas after 1840 and
before 1895.7 This is fortified by the fact that the court nowhere
discussed the civil law nor did it cite any civil law authorities.
If, on the other hand, the limited adoption in 1840 of the com-
mon law as a rule of decision in Texas did not, because of the
wide divergence of conditions in Texas from those in England
and the subsequent passage of Texas irrigation statutes,6" change
the then existing Spanish and Mexican laws of riparian rights in
Texas, then the court in the Clements case wholly ignored a dis-
cussion of the applicable Spanish and Mexican law and authori-
ties, and the decision would be nothing more than judicial fiat
and would not be a sound authority for any purpose. It is be-
lieved that this latter alternative more accurately evaluates the
case as authority as is more fully demonstrated later in this
paper.69
65 The earliest grant in Reeves County, in which the land in suit was located, was in
1860. See Vol. 8 at 1176 "Abstracts All Original Land Titles Comprising Grants and
Locations to August 31, 1941," a publication of the General Land Office, Austin, Texas.
66 "That the Common Law of England (so far as it is not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution or Acts of Congress now in force) shall, together with such acts be the rule
of decision in this Republic, and shall continue in full force until altered or repealed
by Congress." 2 G~sut's LAWS OF TFXAS 177.
67 Supra note 66, and Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) art. 7619, which reads: "Nothing
in this Chapter contained shall be construed as a recognition of any riparian right in
the owner of any lands the title to which shall have passed out of the State of Texas
subsequent to the first day of July, A. D. 1895."
as See discussion infra at 402-411.
69 See discussion inIra at 423-425.
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The second case relied on by the court is that of Martin v.
Burr.7 ° The land in this suit appears to have been granted by the
State of Coahuila and Texas,7 but the court did not even mention
either the Spanish or Mexican law of irrigation. It could hardly
be regarded as a well considered case on the point. But the self-
sufficient reason why this case could not be authority for the con-
clusion reached by the court in the Motl case concerning the
vested right of a riparian to waters of the adjacent stream for irri-
gation, is'the fact that the case did not involve that issue. It was a
suit by a lower riparian owner to establish his right to the use
of the stream's waters for domestic use and to enjoin an upper
riparian from interfering with that use by the diversion of exces-
sive amounts for irrigation.72 The court simply held that the right
to waters of a flowing stream for domestic use was superior to,
one's claim to the waters for irrigation.7" There is no semblance
of a statement anywhere in the opinion to the effect that the orig-
inal grantee of riparian lands got from the sovereign a vested
right in the waters of the adjoining stream for irrigation. 74
The third case cited by the court is that of Board of Water
Engineers v. McKnight.75 The court there unquestionably and
necessarily proceeded on the assumption that a riparian had a
vested right in the waters of the adjoining stream for irrigation.7T
Here again the lands involved were granted after 1840,77 and the
court cited to support its assumption the Clements case herein-
above discussed, and McGee Irrigation Ditch Co. v. Hudson,"8
which contains some statements supporting the position for which'
70 Ill Tex. 57, 228 S. W. 543 (1921)
71 Vol. 5 at 127, 227, 235, and 243, Minutes of the District Court, Kinney County,
Texas.
72 228 S. W. at 544.
73 Ibid.
74 The closest the court got to such a statement was to say that the plaintiff's cause
of action was not one "for recovery of real estate" within the meaning of our limitation
statutes "though the riparian rights (here a right to waters for domestic use) should be-
regarded as part and parcel of the land itself." 228 S. W. at 545.
75 111 Tex. 82, 229 S. W. 301 (1921).
76 229 S. W. at 304.
77 This statement may be open to question. The suit arose in Reeves County where-
no grants were made prior to 1860. See supra note 65. It appears from a reading of the-
case, however, that lands of more than one county were involved. It is common knowl-
edge, however, that little land in this area was granted by either the Spanish or Mexican'
governments.
78 85 Tex. 587, 22 S. W. 398 (1893).
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it is cited. But as a subsequent analysis of this case reveals, such
statements when fully analyzed are of puzzling significance.79
While in the McKnight case it might be fairly said that the
state was a party since the Board of Water Engineers was in court
represented by the Attorney General of Texas, it is of novel and
arresting interest to note that the state was not a party to the
Watkins Land case, the McGhee Irrigation Ditch case, or Martin
v. Burr. When these cases were decided, on which the court relied
in the Motl case to establish a vested right of a riparian to waters
for irrigation neither gained by use nor lost by nonuse, the state,
the statutorily designated owner of at least some of the waters in
issue," and also the representative of the public, was not even a
party to the suit nor otherwise in court. Thus we have the puzzling
situation of suits involving great overriding issues of public policy
of vital interest to the state as a whole-the rights in uses of pub-
lic property-being decided in private litigation between upper
and lower riparians without the owner of such property, the pub-
lic, having an opportunity to present its position. On the point
of the existence of riparian rights to irrigate superior to that of
the state to provide for the conservation and most efficient use of
its water supply, these cases were not true adversary proceed-
ings. The situation pungently points up the incongruities and
difficulties encountered in attempting to define, through the me-
dium of private litigation, the usufructary rights in a forever
fugitive substance not capable of being owned in the usual sense
of property ownership. The skimpy consideration given by the
court in these cases to the pertinent authorities and historical back-
ground necessary to a proper decision of the issue for which they
were cited in the Motl case strikingly illustrates the undesirability
of having the court establish through purely private litigation
policies of such vital and widespread importance. If it be con-
ceded that the judgments are binding on the parties before the
court, surely it would not be urged that the state in its proprietary
capacity is bound.
If rightly decided, the cases relied on by the court do provide
the conclusion reached in the Motl case with some measure of
7 See discussion infra at 408-409.
80 See infra at 407.
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support even when so discounted. It is believed, however, that the
decisions of such cases, even on a common law theory, are er-
roneous."' If that is correct, neither Motl v. Boyd nor any of the
Texas cases relied on by it, have any solid legal basis to support
them.
If we turn from those cases and pre-statehood statutes to those
state statutes which specifically refer to and deal with irrigation 2
we find little, if any, support for the position that the right, or
privilege as the case may be, to waters for irrigation was con-
fined to the owners of riparian lands. The Act of 18528 is the
first of such statutes and it authorized the
County courts... to order, regulate and control the time, mode and
manner of erecting, repairing, cleaning, guarding and protecting the
dams, ditches, roads and bridges, belonging to any irrigation farms
... owned conjointly by two or more different persons... (and) sit-
uated outside of a corporation having jurisdiction thereof."'
and authorized such courts to
assess and collect fines for breaches of any regulations.., recognized
by said Court as consistent with ancient usage and the law of the State
... and may regulate the right of way, the stoppage and passage of
the water, and the right distribution of the shares of said water.85 (Em-
phasis added.)
It further provided that
Upon application of the owners of any suitable lands and water...
the commissioners' courts are authorized ... to license such owners to
proceed and dam the water, and to ditch, fence and irrigate their
lands. 86
It further provided for the condemnation for dams and ditches
of the land of "any person refusing to consent thereto," and for
the extension of irrigation ditches for the irrigation of farms "at
81 See discussion inira at 423-425.
82 These are the statutes referred to supra at 380-381. They are the ones to which it
seems the court should have looked for the state's policy on irrigation rather than to those
post 1879 public land stautes on which it in part relied.
83 3 GAMMEL'S LAWS OF TEXAs 958.
S4 Id. § 1.
85 Id. § 2.
86 Id. § 4.
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and below, or at the sides of other such property." 7 (Emphasis
added.)
It might be urged that the term "owners of any suitable lands
and water" indicated that the whole statutory scheme pertained
to riparians only. This seems doubtful, however, in view of the
fact that there were "suitable lands" for irrigation not riparian,
and that the view has never been entertained with respect to Texas
lands that the adjoining owners actually owned the water in statu-
torily navigable streams. So the legislature must have meant own-
ers of any lands suitable for irrigation from an available source
of supply. This is consistent with the tenor of the remainder of
the statute and particularly those parts which provide for the
condemnation of a right-of-way over the lands of objecting per-
sons,88 and that which provides for the extension of irrigation to
farms "at and below, or at the sides of other such property." If
in fact, however, the statute comprehended a plan for riparians
only, it indicates they were to get water for irrigation as a matter
of grace and not as a matter of right.
Chief Justice Morrill, in speaking of this statute in the case of
Tolle v. Correth"9 stated, "The Act of February 10, 1852, Articles
3945 to 3952, (Paschals Dig.) concerning irrigation property,
shows that the legislature regarded the irrigation of lands as of
primary importance, and intended to carry out the principles of
the Mexican Laws." (Emphasis added.)
Irrespective of any finespun arguments about the exact lan-
guage used, we have here our first state irrigation statute, some-
thing of a major effort, passed only seven years after statehood,
and before any Texas court decision dealing with riparian rights,
which contains no mention of vested irrigation rights of riparians
and contains no indication that any distinction was to be made
between riparians and non-riparians in the use of the waters of
our streams for irrigation. The preponderating tenor seems to be
clearly otherwise. And it is highly significant that this law was
87 Id. § 5.
88 It is quite possible, as the irrigated tract in the Motl case reveals, that all the lands
to be irrigated from a ditch crossing other lands could be riparian, but such would not
necessarily be the case.
89 31 Tex. 362 (1868). The court reporter in this case used the term riparian which,
in so far as our search reveals, is the emergence of the term into our case law ter-
minology.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
authorized by Representative Maverick of San Antonio90 and was
moved through the House on motions of Representatives Browder
of El Paso and Neighbors of San Antonio, 91 and was steered
through the Senate by Senator Rufus Doane of El Paso.92 The
basis is exceedingly strong for assuming that these legislators were
familiar with the irrigation systems as they were operating in their
respective home districts. " Such systems, as we have seen, 94 ap-
parently made no distinction between riparian and nonriparian
lands in the distribution for irrigation of the waters of the normal
flow and underflow of the rivers involved. Apparently these legis-
lators were concerned about legalizing an administrative set up
for going irrigation systems in their districts, systems which orig-
inated under the Mexican Government, and providing a similar
administrative structure for "any new projects of irrigation"95
anywhere in the state.
The fact that this law was authored and sponsored by legisla-
tors familiar with such early Texas systems and was passed by a
legislature consisting of a substantial number of men, all of
whom, who were as much as forty years of age, could have had
first hand knowledge of irrigatiton practices throughout the most
active period of Texas colonization, makes it likely that few, if
any, of that date regarded the riparian, especially the riparian
only, as having a superior right in the waters of our streams for
irrigation. Since this law of 1852 was carried forward verbatim
in the revisions of our irrigation statutes until repealed in 1913,96
and since until 1875 this statute contained our sole legislative
policy on irrigation and was the only statute governing irrigation
at the time of grant of the lands involved in the Motl case, the
court's ignoring it is difficult to understand. From 1875 until its
repeal in 1913, it constituted only a part of our statutory law,
but such other parts contained nothing inconsistent with its policy.
90 House Journal 4th Texas Legislature, proceedings for December 3, 1851.
91 Id., proceedings for January 17, 1852.
92 Senate Journals, 4th Texas Legislature, proceedings for January 26, 27 and 31,
1852. It will be recalled that the area including El Paso did not become a part of Texas
until the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. This was one of the early sessions of the
Legislature of Texas participated in by these El Pasoans.
93 See discussion supra at 393-397 and infra at 416-419.
94 See maps 1 and 2 and discussion references supra, note 93.
95 3 GAMMEL'S LAWS OF TixAs 959.
96 Acts 1913, at 358, § 101.
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As such it was the principal legislative determination of public
policy on irrigation during the period when most of the land in
Texas was granted. It should have become the guide to our courts,
wherever pertinent, in the decision of cases involving irrigation,
anything in the common law to the contrary (if in fact it was)
notwithstanding, for the common law, whatever it was, was to be
the rule of decision only "until altered or repealed." 97
The legislature added to our statutory irrigation law in 1875,"s
but since, for our purposes, that law is identical with its 1876
revision,99 only the latter will be analyzed. The purpose of this
act was to encourage the construction of canals for "navigation
or irrigation." Land grants were provided as the enducement.00
It classified as first class those canals which carried a stream of
water thirty feet wide and five feet deep. 1 The minimum length
of any canal, including the smallest, (to carry a stream six feet
wide and two and one half feet deep) which could qualify its
builder for a grant of land was two miles.0 2 A right of way was
granted over public lands for such canals as well as the free use
of construction materials therefrom.0 3 Such act further provided:
"Any such canal company shall have the free use of the water of
the rivers and streams of this state... "104 that such companies
"shall have the right to cross all roads and highways neces-
sary.. ., "1 and that:
All persons owning lands adjacent to and irrigable from said canal or
ditch shall have the right, to use the water of said canal or ditch .... 106
(Emphasis added.)
This law does not state specifically that irrigation is to proceed
without distinction between riparians and nonriparians, but no
other reasonable conclusion can be drawn from its terms. If only
those contiguous to the streams were to be served, it is unlikely
97 Supra note 66.
98 Act March 10, 1875, at 77.
99 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. Arts. 2989-3001 (1879).
100 Id. Art. 2989.
10, Id. Art. 2991.
102 Ibid.
103 TEX. REV. CtV. STAT. Art. 2996 (1879).
104 Id. Art. 2998.
105 Id. Art. 2999.
208 Id. Art. 3000.
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that a canal carrying a stream of water thirty feet wide and five
feet deep would have been contemplated. And there was no statu-
tory restraint on canal builders going into nonriparian lands, thus
giving nonriparians on the canal a "right" to the waters for irri-
gation.
True, navigation was involved also, but that canals of such size
were contemplated for irrigation only is indicated by the fact
that such act contained a special provision for "canals for naviga-
tion" having a width of 40 feet and a depth of four feet.0 7 Fur-
thermore the minimum length of two miles of even the smallest
canals; the provisions for rights of way across public lands and
across private property; the fact that they could cross roads and
highways, while not wholly inconsistent with the idea of all the
lands being riparian, strongly suggests the contrary. Finally, the
fact that it was provided that all those along the canal were to
have water from it as a matter of right seems highly inconsistent
with the recognized existence of a vested property right in such
waters as a riparian. If those "adjacent to" the canals and those
owning lands adjoining natural watercourses, were one and the
same, then this statutory provision was unnecessary if the riparian
had vested irrigation rights. If the two groups were not the same
then the riparian and nonriparian were being lumped together
for the sharing of waters for irrigation. It is believed that the
legislature proceeded on the latter position and contemplated the
participation of nonriparians and that it did not legislate on the
theory that riparians had a superior vested property right in such
waters for irrigation.
It is realized that the argument could be made that a riparian
could have a vested property right to the use of the waters from
the stream and not from the canal making it necessary for the
statute to confer such right upon him, and this might be so, but
the entire absence of any expressed consciousness of a different
status for irrigation purposes of riparians and nonriparians is
highly significant. Such omission is particularly revealing in that
provision that provides that such companies "shall have the free
use of the water of the rivers and streams of this state."' 8 There
107 Id. Art. 2990.
108 Supra note 104.
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is nothing here about the riparians' vested rights to irrigate. Even
if all those served by a single irrigation project and at a particular
point on the stream were riparians, no protection is afforded for
those riparians lower down.
It is in the Act of 1889 that we find the first legislative con-
sciousness of riparians as a group. Section one of such act pro-
vided that:
The unappropriated waters of every river or natural stream within the
arid portions of the state of Texas, in which, by reason of insufficient
rainfall, irrigation is necessary for agricultural purposes, may be di-
verted from its natural channel for irrigation, domestic, and other
beneficial uses; provided, that said water shall not be diverted so as to
deprive any person who claims, owns, or holds a possessory right or
title to any land lying along the bank or margin of any river or natural
stream of the use of the water thereof jor his own domestic use.109
(Emphasis added.)
Section two of the act provided:
The unappropriated waters of every river or natural stream within the
arid portions of the state, as described in the preceding section of this
act, are hereby declared to be the property of the public, and may be
acquired by appropriaton for the uses and purposes as hereafter pro-
vided.110
Thus the riparian made his entrance into our legislative history,
but with such entrance came a statutory definition of his rights.
There was vouchsafed to him water for his domestic use. The act
proceeded to set up and provide for the operation of a system of
prior appropriatiton of waters for irrigation without distinction
between riparians and nonriparians. In fact section nine of such
act expressly negatives such distinction in its provision that where
one has once perfected his rights to waters by appropriation, it
shall be "unlawful for any other person.., except for domestic
use by one entitled thereto, to so divert the flow" of such streams
as to deprive the appropriator of his "priority of use of the water
to which [he] may be so entitled.' '. (Emphasis added.) Thus
the riparian was recognized as having a right to water only for
domestic use as against a prior appropriator. The act further





provided that as between appropriators the first in time is the
first in right, but that appropriative rights would be lost by a ces-
sation of use.'
The Act of 1889 was discussed in the case of McGhee Irrigating
Ditch Co. v. Hudson."' "Section 2 of the Act,"".4 said the court,
cannot operate, and probably was not intended to operate, on the rights
of riparian owners existing when the law was passed, but was intended
to operate only on such interests as were in the state by reason of its
ownership of lands bordering on rivers or natural streams,115
and indicated some other sections of the act might have to be so
limited. It is believed that the court's conclusion on what the leg-
islature intended is patently unsound. The whole tenor of the
statute is at war with the court's interpretation, and it would be
wholly impractical to apply the court policy on a river having a
patchwork of public and private ownership. The court spoke of
the riparians' right to "have the water flow through their land in
its accustomed channel and to use it for all purposes for which
'a riparian proprietor may use water so flowing." ' The court
spoke elsewhere concerning riparians of the "right to use the
water for proper purposes" and of the diverting by others of
water being "in effect" a taking "of land" of the riparian for
which compensation would have to be paid." 7
Even if the case is rightly decided, it is a bit difficult to ascer-
tain the effect of the court's statements for our purposes. Whether
section one"5. which provided broadly for the diversion of stream
waters subject to the riparian's right to waters for "domestic use"
was one of those "other" sections to be limited, and, if so, to
what extent, is not clear. The reservation to riparians of waters
for "domestic use" may have made it satisfactory. The court
did not state that the riparian had a vested property right in the
waters for the extraordinary use of irrigation. It will be noted
from the above fragmentary quotations from the opinion, that
112 Act March 19, 1889, 21st Leg., §§ 3 and 4.
113 85 Tex. 587, 22 S. W. 967 (1893).
114 Quoted supra at 407.
115 22 S. W. at 968.
11 Ibid.
.17 Ibid.
11s Quoted supra at 407.
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the court was very emphatic that the riparian had some rights
of use, but was matchingly vague on what those rights were. One
might surmise that "domestic use" was all the court had in mind
by way of riparian rights else section one 9 would seem to have
been the most likely target for the court's disapproval instead of
section two.'
20
In addition to the statements of the court being of uncertain
significance, it is believed that they are wrong in so far as they
might be construed to be a holding that the riparian had a vested
right, superior to that of the state to declare unappropriated
waters to be the property of the public, to have the waters of the
adjoining stream flow by in its "accustomed channel" in order
that he might later make use of it for irrigation. The lands in-
volved in this suit are located in Sterling County and were granted
by the State of Texas after 1852.121 In view of the irrigation
history of Mexico and Texas prior to that date, and the perpetuat-
ing significance of the irrigation statute enacted in that year, it
is submitted that there would be no semblance of authority to
support the court's language if so construed. The court cited no
authority and no prior Texas case had so held. 22
Next followed the Act of 1895.123 The act divided the waters
of streams into "ordinary flow or underflow" and "storm or rain
waters." Section 3 of chapter two of such act also provided
"that such flow or underflow of water shall not be diverted to the
prejudice of the rights of the riparian owner without his consent,
except after condemnation." The act did not address itself spe-
cifically to the definition of the riparians rights, but section 10
provides that after appropriation has been perfected as provided
for by the act, "it shall be unlawful for any person ... to...
divert any such water.., except that the owner whose land abuts
on a running stream may use such water therefrom as may be
necessary for domestic purposes." (Emphasis added.) Thus the
119 Quoted supra at 407.
120 Quoted supra at 407.
121 Vol. 7, at 628, "Abstracts All Original Texas Land Titles Comprising Grants and
Locations to August 31, 1941," a publication of the General Land Office, Austin, Texas.
122 Tolle v. Correth, 31 Tex. 362 (1868) and Mud Creek Irrigation Co. v. Vivian,
74 Tex. 170 (1889) might be regarded by some as supporting holdings, but both cases
were decided on the theory that irrigation was a natural use. This theory was repudi-
ated in the case of Watkins Land Co. v. Clements. 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733 (1905).
123 Acts Texas Legislature 1895, at 21.
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riparian's right to water for irrigation is, by clear implication,
made subordinate to that of a prior appropriator. Section 11 of
such act deals with the formation of irrigation corporations. Some
light is shed on who is entitled to water for irrigation by the lan-
guage used. It provided that corporations could be formed
for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating canals,
ditches, flumes, feeders, laterals, reservoirs, dams, lakes and wells, and
of conducting and transferring water to all persons entitled to the same
for irrigation, mining, milling...
All persons who own or hold a possessory right or title to land ad-joining or contiguous to any canal, ditch, flume or lateral constructed
or maintained under the provisions of this chapter, and who shall have
secured a right to the water in said canal, ditch, flume, lateral, reservoir,
dam or lake, shall be entitled to be supplied from such canal, ditch...
with water for irrigation of such land... (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing here to indicate that the legislature had in
mind any distinction between riparians and nonriparians regard-
ing their rights to waters for irrigation. It seems that both were
on an equal footing in "secur(ing) a right" to the waters in-
volved.
Thus through 1895, it appears that, on the whole, the legisla-
ture was little concerned with distinctions between riparians and
nonriparians, and that when the legislature took note of the
riparian at all, it was to preserve to him as against the appro-
priator, waters for his domestic use only. The remainder of the
statutes down to date will not be subjected to detailed analysis.
It will suffice to say that these statutes have been read and nowhere
has our legislature ever expressly and specifically recognized that
the riparian had a right to waters for irrigation superior to those
of a non-riparian who legally obtained access to such waters.
The legislature has included a provision in all its general enact-
ments preserving "vested rights,"' 24 but it has never defined those
rights. The closest it has ever come to it is the provision in the
Act of 1913 which states in effect that nothing in the act shall be
construed to impair riparian rights as recognized by the laws of the
state "as construed by the decisions of our supreme court. ' 125
124 The terminology has varied but the meaning in all the statutes is essentially the
same.
125 Acts Texas Legislature 1913, § 98a.
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So the court in Moi v. Boyd, in ignoring these irrigation stat-
utes, had lost to it the most fertile source for getting the legisla-
tive appraisal of riparian rights at and subsequent to 1852, the
period in which the land involved in the Motil case was granted.
Instead it turned to struggle with Mexican statutes from which,
because of inadequate research, background and training, it drew
a grossly erroneous conclusion. Nothing cited by the court soundly
supports its conclusion that all riparian lands and riparian lands
only acquired a right to waters for irrigation from our Texas
streams.
Part II
TEXAS IRRIGATION LAW HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED AND THE
EFFECT OF MOTL V. BOYD UNDER THE RULE OF STARE DECISIS
If the authorities relied on by the court did -not support the
conclusions reached, what was the civil law, as modified by
Mexican Law and practice, with respect to the rights of the waters
of rivers and other streams to the time of 1840 when, generally
speaking, we adopted the common law of England as the rule of
decision?
Continuity and understanding of the Mexican Civil Law on
irrigation will be aided if we see it against the Spanish law back-
ground. The Spanish law and practice of irrigation prior to 1840
was strongly local in character and had its roots deep in the
ancient civilization of the Moors.126
The survival and vigor of these local customs was no doubt
contributed to by the weakness and instability of the Spanish
central government. There were revolts and counter revolts, and
often it was difficult to ascertain the status as law of any decree
of the central government, or worse still, to find the decree it-
126 "On the expulsion of the Moors, as I have said, the provinces retaining part of
the Moorish or mixed blood populations, were permitted to cultivate their fields and to
operate their canals with the waters allotted to them by the Moorish governments, and
their customs were not set aside by the general laws of the country. Thus the foundation
was laid for the present local customary laws in the irrigation regions. The people clung
to their peculiar privileges." HALL, IRRIGATION DEvELOPMENT 364 (1885) (hereinafter
cited as HALL).
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self.'27 But by such general law as there was, running waters were
made the common property of all men though its use was subject
to regulation.12 Towns, which were often extended countrysides,
controlled much of the water supply and this precluded the exist-
ence of a riparian status based upon vested property rights pro-
tectable by due process through the medium of private litiga-
tion. 29 On the contrary when the law of waters was codified in
1879, it appears that the continued right in any community of
irrigators to continue the use of waters for such purposes was
determined not primarily by riparian status but was dependent on
their formation of an association.' Certainly any effective voice
127 "Indeed, the whole system of administration has undergone so many shocks and
revolutions during the present century that it is not always easy to determine the precise
location even of the archives themselves, through which the course of any particular leg-
islation is to be traced. So many councils have been modified, abolished, and recreated
with new functions, and the duties of all and each have been so often altered and trans-
ferred that, even after ascertaining the date and origin of a decree or order, it is next
to impossible, often to discover in what vortex of the documentary chaos the authorita-
tive original may be revolving." WALLIS, THE INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC MEN
OF SPAIN, 69 (1853)..
"The government of Spain is a constitutional monarchy, but its apparent stability
as such is of but very recent dating. Constitutional principles were advanced and crys-
tallized into a constitution in 1812, and Ferdinand swore to support it, but one of his
first acts were to overthrow the instrument and banish its supporters. It was revived in
1820, but only to be again stricken down and replaced by autocracy more complete.
"At the death of Ferdinand in 1833, his widow, Maria Christine, grasped the reins
of government in the interest of her infant daughter, Isabella. To make friends against
the king's brother, Don Carlos, the representative of the party opposed to all reform,
the regent Christina courted the support of the constitutionalists, and promulgated a
sort of constitution in 1834. But this did not satisfy the liberals; so in 1836 the consti-
tution of 1812 was readopted. The constituent cortes immediately framed another funda-
mental law, which was promulgated in 1837. The civil war ended in 1839, and with it,
for the time, the pretensions of Don Carlos. Cristina, after a popular outbreak, fled the
country in 1840, and renounced the segency." HALL at 435-36.
128 ... "The laws of the Partidas as given in the Institutes and also embodied in the
Recopilacion, show 'the division of things with respect to propertyship' to have been
the same with the early Spaniards as with the Romans before them: running waters were
a common property of all men; and rivers, a public property of the nation.
"Other classes of the common property were free to the use of every citizen of the
town, without rent, but much use was subject to regulation of the town councils, and
to supervision by the alcaldes and their subordinates." HALL 366-67.
129 "Now the town holdings or terminos, were frequently extended regions of the
country in the olden time, and 'there was a great deal of municipal law regulating the
use of water, and officers to take control of it.' So that the general laws respecting water-
courses were often overlooked and unknown, as compared to municipal regulations and
customs on the subject....
"Under these circumstances, where the use of water in one town holding interfered
with that in another, the dealings were as between the communities and not between
the individuals ....
"All running waters available for irrigation, within their terminos, belonged to the
towns, notwithstanding apportionment. Hence, there was no conflict by reason of ripar-
ian claims, for under such circumstances there was no riparian right." HALL 370-71.
130 Arts. 226-228, General Law or Code of Spain on Watercourses, Waters, and Irri-
gation. Printed as Appendix III, HALL 589.
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in the administration and distribution of such waters was depend-
ent on being a member of such an organization."'
The law of waters in Spain before and through our period of
colonization was, in so far as it is of substantial importance to
us here, divided into the law of rivers and their waters and of
small streams and their waters.132 A river was classified as a
stream which "runs perpetually and from time immemorial."
Their waters were public, and, unless the government had appro-
priated the waters for its own use, any person could, respecting
the prior rights of others, take waters from them for his use.
There is no indication that this privilege was limited to riparians.
It was strongly indicated however that use by anyone was the
measure of the water to be taken. Navigation was protected always,
But should the river not be navigable any resident of a town through
which it passes may take out a portion of its waters, and construct a
ditch for the irrigation of his lands, or to move his mill or water wheel,
or for other purpose that may interest him, provided he does it without
any injury to the common use, or the destination that the town may
have given the waters, and under the understanding that if the ditch
has to cross lands not his own, of the royal patrimony, or of the mu-
nicipality, the permission of the owner, of the king, or of the municipal
council will be indispensable.133 (Emphasis added.)
The owners of lands bordering non-navigable rivers could use
such waters for the benefit of their estates provided it did not
interfere with the communal use, the use by the towns,134 and was
done subject to law and government regulation. At most it seemed
to be a privilege of use, but which, as appeared to be true of all
other established uses, would be protected once it had begun and
only so long as it continued.
Let us turn now to the law of small streams. Hall introduces
his discussion of "Small streams and Riparian Rights" with the
statement that the use of the waters of small streams
131 Id. Arts. 230-241, at 505.
132 Unless otherwise indicated, the comments made on these two subdivisions of the
Spanish law will be based upon HALL 371-76, and his citations from the various works
of Escriche. Specific citations will not be made.
233 Escriche as quoted by HALL 372-73.
184 That the use of "towns" was quite extensive and probably included waters for
the irrigation of such nonriparian property is indicated supra note 129.
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Was left very much to municipal ordinances and ancient local custom,
and of course these varied in different ports of Spain, but Escriche
made a code governing rights on these streams, as applicable where no
such ordinances or customs prevailed, which he "founded on equity
and the interests of agriculture," and on the laws which he refers to.
I present translated extracts, without comment except to call attention
to the fact that on several important points the new law of waters has
certainly not been framed on this author's writings as an authority. 13 5
It will be recalled that these streams were very small and of only
limited importance in Spain's economy.' The following quota-
titons from Escriche as set out by Hall3 7 give the heart of the
law of waters of small streams as Escriche has formulated it.
If running water passes between the properties of different owners,
each one of the latter can use it for the irrigation of his property, or for
any other object; not entirely, however, but only in the part that be-
longs to him, because all have equal rights, and consequently, they can
prevent each other from taking more than their respective shares.
The riparian proprietor cannot without the consent of the other
riparian owners interested, concede to a third party, to their injury,
the power of taking water from the same stream or on his estate, nor
himself use the water to irrigate another property which belongs to
him, but which is not situated on the bank; although this right can be
acquired by prescription.
If Escriche is accepted as authoritative on this phase of Span-
ish water law, 38 and if the above is confined to its niche in the
Spanish legal structure on the subject,3 9 it is apparent that it was
of very limited significance. How insignificant, or at least how
insecure the privilege was, is shown by the fact that it was essen-
tially ignored in the codification of the water law of Spain in
1879.140 It is only when the two above paragraphs quoted from
135 HALL 374.
136 Supra at 381-383.
137 HALL 374-75.
138 That Hall entertained serious doubts about Escriche as an authority in this
particular area is indicated by this comment: "Those parts translated under the head-
ings 'Of Small streams and Riparian Rights'... seem to have been very largely his
(Escriche's) own view of what ought to be, for the sake of 'equity and agriculture';
and, hence, I have presented translations, and not abridgements of them. His system
of riparian rights seems to have been founded on French rather than on Spanish law;
for he accords all riparian proprietors on small streams an equal right of servitude to
the waters which is the French law but for which I find no sufficient authority in the
old Spanish laws." HALL 382.139 See discussion supra at 381-383.
140 Supra at 412-413; in/ra note 147.
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Escriche are taken out of context, out of the overall Spanish irri-
gation setting of that day, freed fiom the limitations and condi-
tions imposed on them there, and applied broadly to all water
courses in countries such as ours that they take on sweeping im-
portance.
Local self government in irrigation matters was at first only
tolerated in Spain, and at times very reluctantly, but was later
adopted as a national policy."' It should be helpful, therefore,
to briefly examine the operations at Valencia, one of those local
systems. The irrigated garden plain is several miles in width
consisting of 26,350 acres and the property is, in the main,
minutely subdivided. Irrigation water is taken from the Turia
by eight main canals, lateralling off from each of which is a net-
work of smaller distributing ditches.' 42 Irrigation was practiced
here before the thirteenth century, but in that century the Spanish
King granted to and confirmed the right of the local inhabitants
to the waters and canals in that community. 43 The irrigators de-
pendent on each canal formed separate communities with gov-
ernmental structures containing the essential legislative, execu-
tive and judicial elements. The chief legislative body is the bian-
nual assembly of all the irrigators. The principal administrative
officer is the syndic who is an elected laborer of the irrigation
community and who is the active superintendent of the works,
and who, with other syndics, comprise an administrative court.
When a shortage of water develops, the syndics of the Valencia
area meet with others from irrigation communities up stream to
work out an apportionment of waters. The provisional govern-
ment is alert to keep the peace. When the division has been agreed
141 "During the last century, several governmental attacks on the irrigation admin-
istration system prevalent in the eastern provinces, were made. The people of other
quarters wished to adopt the system of local self government, and establish 'tribunals
of waters,' or 'juries of irrigation;' but the government held that the town authorities
were the proper local administrative bodies for community irrigations, and that special
courts of waters were incompatible with the national judiciary system. Attempts were
even made to abolish the water court of Valencia-the parent of all the institutions of
this kind-but these failed, as we have seen. Then came the time when the opposition
gradually ceased. This was through the period heretofore written of as that of early
constitutional development. Following on has been a term when the principles of con-
stitutional monarchy have been apparently victorious in Spain, and with their triumph
has risen and been adopted, as a part of the national law, the principle of local self




upon, the syndics return to their communities to administer their
allotment. The complaints of, and disputes between, the irrigators
are heard by a unique body known as the Tribunal of Waters.
which is composed, as stated above, of the elected syndics of each
community.'44
It is noticeable that in the entire description by Hall of this
local system, riparians are never mentioned. Obviously, they were
not the only ones receiving irrigation waters in an irrigated valley
several miles in width containing more than 26,000 acres, where
the property was minutely subdivided. In times of shortage appar-
ently all suffered alike. Hall describes eight other local systems, 45
and in none does it appear that riparians were though of or
treated as a class apart. In this connection it is significant that
the 1879 water law of Spain 46 vouchsafed to the riparian on
small streams an amount of water (0.35 cubic ft. per second of
time) which would probably not fill more than what would now
be classified as domestic needs.'47 The situation on navigable
streams was controlled by Art. 184 of that law which provided
that riparians could install, without governmental permission,
pumps, other than steam pumps, for the purpose of withdrawing
water for irrigation. Art. 185 required special permission to con-
struct any sort of permanent dam, weir, etc. in any type of stream.
As a practical matter this no doubt gave the riparian on navigable
streams only a very limited statutorily confirmed right to its waters
for irrigation. And the statute speaks in terms of permission and
limitation rather than in terms of recognition of a non-touchable
property right.
The significance of all this lies in the probability that the local
144 HALL 387-96.
145 HALL 398-432.
146 Supra note 130.
147 "Now, this amount of water is very small; it would be carried in a stream 1 foot
wide and 41/ inches deep, flowing at an average rate of one foot per second-a mere
little trough of water, such as is used in the irrigation of a garden patch.
"The extent of the unrestricted privilege of the most favored riparian proprietor
upon a small stream, below the tract of the water-source, therefore, is to divert and use
a little more than one third of a cubic foot per second, and to construct, for the purpose,
in the channel, a dam or barrier of earth or loose stone, which would be carried out by
the first freshet, and in no way affect the flood regime of the stream. Going beyond this,
he must obtain permission from the administration. Here comes in the principle of gov-
ernmental control and authorization, more fully treated of under a subsequent heading;
but with respect to the practice as applied to proprietors on small streams, it is well to
close the subject here." HALL 448-49.
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irrigation system with which the Spaniards were familiar migrated
with them to America rather than Escriche's views of what, for
the sake of "equity and the interests of agriculture," the law
ought to be.14 An observer of the systems in both countries found
much similarity between those in Spain and those of the New
World.149 Our information confirms that similarity.
Limitations of time, money for translations, together with the
disorganized state of the records in which some of the research
had to be done, has kept us from having all the information
needed for making a detailed comparison of the old Spanish
irrigation systems, such as Valencia above described, with those
of the New World, but all the information available points to
the fact that they were quite similar. The similarities will be
apparent if, with the Valencia system in mind, we list the prin-
cipal features of the San Antonio system. It will be noticed from
Maps 1 and 2 that each major ditch or acequia served a com-
munity of irrigators. Within the framework of the general gov-
ernment there was a self-governing organization for each such
community. 150 It will also be noted from Map 2 that the gravity
148 Supra note 138.
149 "The Spaniards had themselves been taught how to farm with the aid of irriga-
tion by the Moors, who held southern Spain from the eighth to the fifteenth century,
and who, in the early part of their occupation of that country, laid out those magnificent
irrigation works which exist to the present day. Having passed several years of my life
in Spain, I have had abundant opportunities of studying the ancient systems of irriga-
tion as there practiced, and during a long residence in the Mesilla Valley I have been
able to compare the two systems, which I find almost identical." F. C. BARKER, IRRIcA-
lON IN MESILLA VALLEY, NEW MExico, 10-14 Water Supply Papers, U. S. G. S.
It is recognized that the Mesilla Valley is not a grant of Texas, but both areas were
for a long time under the jurisdiction of Spain and later Mexico, and the early irriga-
tion systems in both were developed under the same governmental systems.
150 Beginning at 46 of CORNER, SAN ANTONIO DEBEXAR (1890), there is an interest-
ing description of the building of the upper labor ditch in Bexar County. The following
are two brief excerpts from that description:
"He (Governor Ripperda) accordingly issued an ordinance requesting the neigh-
bors and those who may wish to contribute to the taking of the water, to enlist them.
selves forthwith, contributing every one any 'necessary utensils' and the Baron promises
that the partition of the lands 'will be made with the due equity of chance.' He insists
that the person who may take charge of the work must possess intelligence and experi-
ence; the election of the Acequiero to be decided by a plurality of votes among the
shareholders. The Acequiero elected shall be entitled to an extra portion or suerte of
land, but he shall furnish two additional men.
"In the meanwhile, we may surmise that things went along smoothly for a while,
for nothing more is heard of the Upper Labor Ditch and its construction until July 13th,
1776, when we learn of the second election, in which one Angel Galin is elected over
his opponent, Bartholome Seguin, to take the place of Toribio Puentes, who, for 'reasons
by him exposed, which were found sufficient,' makes application to be relieved and to be
awarded the emoluments in land, etc., to which he was entitled. He is relieved on July
15th, on the condition that he put two men daily on the work of construction until the
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method of irrigation was used which resulted in tapping the river
much above the lands to be irrigated. In fact it is doubtful that
with the then known and feasible methods of irrigation it would
have been practical to take water directly from the river onto
the adjoining land for irrigation. And finally it will be observed
that a number of the tracts of land obviously served by these
mother ditches were not riparian to the river. And in all the lit-
erature read concerning the San Antonio irrigation systems and
their operations, as was true of that regarding the operation of
the Spanish systems, riparians were never once mentioned as a
class.
In the transcript filed in the San Antonio Court of Civil Ap-
peals in the case of the City of Ysleta v. Babbitt,Nloa No. 464, we
find an informative description of the irrigation layout in the
Ysleta area. While the description appears in the plaintiff's orig-
inal and amended petitions, the facts of significance to us here
do not appear to have been seriously controverted. The Town of
Ysleta seemed to be at that time one of those sprawling, Spanish
type towns referred to previously'51 which contained an abundance
of irrigated farm land.'52 The ditch or acequia seemed to serve
a community of irrigators whose right to water was based upon
having done work in constructing and repairing the ditch and in
being a riparian thereto. 5' The map in the transcript is a bit am-
biguous on the point, but it appears that plaintiff's land was not
riparian to the river.5  And from the defendant's answer, it ap-
pears that the history of this ditch and its community of irrigators
reaches back into the Mexican past from which it brought for-
new director shall bring the irrigation to a convenient place, which means that the first
suertes of land would be drawn for and granted when the water had been conveyed
over sufficient land to warrant a partition."
15o0 28 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
I') Supra note 129.
152 "That plaintiff is a resident and citizen of the City of Ysleta and has a farm
within the limits of said city and adjacent to the irrigation ditches.., and (defendant:
City of Ysleta) has been accustomed to furnishing his said farm with water for irriga-
tion. Transcript of Record, pp. 2, 6, City of Ysleta v. Babbitt, 28 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1894).
153 "That plaintiff with others in former years constructed and made said ditch, and
has during the term of more than ten years last past... aided by labor and money in
maintaining, repairing and keeping in effective operation the said acequia, and is a
riparian owner of said acequia and is entitled to his proportion of the waters flowing
through same." (Emphasis added.) Transcript of Record, p. 6, City of Ysleta v. Babbitt,
supra note 152.
154 Id., p. 36.
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ward a system of administration by "alcaldes" suggestive of that
by the syndics of Valencia. 5 '
When we turn to the legal writers on Mexican water law, we
find the conclusions consistent with the physical operations. We
have noted that by Spanish decree, the waters of the Indies, which
included Texas, were declared to be the common property of all.156
This is in keeping with the Spanish law announced as follows in
the Partidas:
The things which belong in common to the creatures of the world are
the following, namely; the air, the rainwater, and the sea and its shores,
for every living creature can use each of these things according as it
has need of them.157
There was undoubtedly a close kinship and much overlapping
between Spanish, Mexican and early Texas irrigation law and
practice. Kinney states with respect to the Mexican law on riparian
rights:
By the time the civil law had been sifted down through the various
transformations down to the Government of Mexico, at the time of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the civil law rules upon the subject of
waters had been modified in a number of ways. Under the Mexican
law at this period the rivers and streams belonged to the nation, the use
of the waters to the inhabitants in common. That is to say, as long as
the waters were flowing in their natural channels they were 'publici
juris,' 'res communes,' 'bonum vacans,' or the common property of all
the inhabitants. 158
Elsewhere he states,
However, according to the Mexican law, the Mexican government
possesses the power of retaining the waters in their natural channels; or,
by way of convenience, of conferring the exclusive use of a portion or
the whole of the waters of a certain stream to individuals or corporations
upon such terms and conditions and with such limitations as it saw fit
to establish by law, and that, too, whether they were riparian owners
or not.... In a number of respects, however, rights were acquired in
Mexico which were a departure from and at variance with the ancient
civil law rules. Among these was the exclusive right which might be
155 Id., p. 13.
158 Supra at 384.
157 Las Siete Partidas, Part III, Tit. XXVIII, Law III.
158 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 577 (2d ed. 1912).
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acquired in the waters of a stream to irrigate nonriparian lands.159
(Emphasis added.)
The Mexican law permitted diversion from the rivers and streams not
navigable, and by those who were not riparian owners, and for the irri-
gation of lands not riparian.160 (Emphasis added).
In the case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States of
Guiterres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 47
L. Ed. 588, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338, it was conceded by both sides that, by
the laws of Mexico in force when the territory of New Mexico was ceded
to the United States, the use of waters of both navigable and non-naviga-
ble streams was not limited to riparian lands but extended as well to
lands which did not lie upon the banks of rivers and streams.161
That the riparian's position was one of some superiority is
indicated by this additional quotation from Kinney:
Upon the examination of the Mexican law of waters, there can be no
question but what there were certain rights which might be acquired
by virtue of the ownership of the land along the stream. These rights
were somewhat analgous to the common law of riparian rights ... But
as we understand the law of waters to have been under the Mexican
law, the use of nonnavigable streams was under the control of the Mex-
ican Government, and, as we have stated in a previous section, it had
the power of retaining the waters in their natural channels for the sole
use of riparian owners; or, by way of concession, the right of confer-
ring the exclusive use of a portion or the whole of the waters of such
a stream to individuals or corporations, for use on non-riparian
lands.162 (Emphasis added.)
Our courts have uniformly said that the law in effect at the
time of the grant of public lands determines the extent and na-
ture of the estate acquired by the grantee. 16 Consequently, on
the basis of the quotations from Kinney and the other authorities
noted, the following can be said of all public lands granted along
rivers and streams in Texas at least prior to 1840:
159 Id. § 577.
160 Id. § 578.
16 Id. § 580.
"It is conceded on behalf of appellant (the appellees' case being based on such
position) that, by the laws of Mexico in force when the territory of New Mexico was
ceded to the United States, (1848) the use of the waters both of navigable and unnav-
igable streams was not limited to riparian lands, but extended as well to lands which did
not lie upon the banks of the rivers, and that such use was subject to be regulated and
controlled by the public authorities." Guiterres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation
Company, 188 U. S. 545 (1902).
162 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 1000 (2d ed. 1912).
163 Manry v. Robinson, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S. W. 2d 438, 442 (1932) ; Miller v. Letz-
erich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W. 2d 404, 407 (1932).
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1. The riparian unquestionably acquired a choice means of
access to the water for all lawful purposes which constituted a
superior position of value.""
2. That all the rights or privileges which riparians acquired
were subject to a congenital infirmity because of the superior power
of the government to grant the exclusive right to obtain and use
a portion or all of such water by riparians on nonriparian land
or by nonriparians on nonriparian lands." 5
3. That these infirmities of the riparian as to lands granted
prior to 1840 continued after that date, and the concomitant power
of government over such lands continued automatically in the
Texas government.' 66
The force of Kinney's conclusions on the status of pertinent
Mexican laws on irrigation is enhanced by the fact that all of the
pieces of the puzzle now fit together. All "irrigable" lands or
lands "suitable for irrigation," whether riparian or nonriparian,
commanded a better price than nonirrigable lands simply be-
cause under the law of Mexico and of Texas to 1840, water could
be acquired for their irrigation without regard to their riparian
nature. By the same token, land "not irrigable" or "without the
facilities of irrigation," whether riparian or nonriparian, com-
manded a lesser price. As the above analysis of pre-1840 grants
reveals, the overwhelming majority of riparian lands which were
classified fell into the latter category.'67 Under the interpretations
of Mexican law as advanced by Kinney, the early irrigation prac-
tices in Texas and Mexico were legal and not frontier practices
in defiance of the law. Similarly, the administration of the coloni-
zation laws and decrees by the early land commissioners become
correct and proper instead of inaccurate and irresponsible. And
164 See note 4 supra.
185 Kinney does not discuss the problem of access but Part III, Tit. XXXI Law IV
of the Partidas states that one estate was subject to a servitude in favor of another for
the construction of canals for irrigation. The Partidas was part of the basic law of
Mexico. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATn RiCHTS 990 (2d ed. 1912).
16( Airhart v. Massieu, 98 U. S. 491 (1878) ; Manry v. Robinson, 122 Tex. 213,
56 S. W. 2d 438 (1932); Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W. 2d 404 (1932)
Musquis v. Blake, 24 Tex. 461 (1859); Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113 (1859);
McMullen v. Hodge et al, 5 Tex. 34 (1849) ; Wharton, Early Judicial History of Texas,
12 Texas L. Rev. 311, 324 (1934). Also the act of 1840 adopting the common law as the
rule of decision in Texas and repealing some of its prior laws especially preserved those
on grants and the colonization of lands. Sayles' Early Laws of Texas, Vol. 1, at 334;
Sayles' Real Estate Laws of Texas, Vol. 1, at 21.
187 Supra at 388-398.
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perhaps of greatest significance of all, the irrigation acts of our
various legislatures as heretofore analyzed, and particularly those
of 1852, 1876, and 1889, become consistent with such laws and
practices instead of an attempt to chart a new course in irrigation
law and to destroy vested property rights.
It should be recalled that Chief Justice Morrill stated in Tolle
v. Correth168 that the legislature by the Act of February 10, 1852,
"intended to carry out the principles of the Mexican laws.'
16 9
About 120,000,000 acres of Texas' estimated 172,687,000
acres were included originally in grants issuing from the Spanish
and Mexican governments. Approximately 100,000,000 of those
acres were granted by the Mexican government between 1821
and 1836.170 Title to all of the lands under these grants could not
be perfected under the laws of Texas, however, but 26,280,000
acres of such lands are now being held under those grants.'
This is slightly more than 1/7 of the land acreage of Texas; and
it is common knowledge that these lands are so massed in the
southern part of Texas and along its rivers as to constitute a much
higher fraction of the irrigable land area than of the state as a
whole.
This means, however, that the title to most of our lands in
Texas rest on grants made after 1840. What of the law after that
year? In that year the Congress of the Republic of Texas enacted
that:
The common law of England (so far as it is not inconsistent with
the constitution or the acts of congress now in force), shall, together
with such acts, be the rule of decision in the republic, and shall con-
tinue in full force until altered or repealed by congress.172
That all Laws in force in this Republic, prior to the first of Septem-
ber one thousand eight hundred and thirty six (except for the laws of
consultation and provisional government, now in force, and except
such laws as relate exclusively to grants and the colonization of lands
in the state of Coahuila and Texas.... ) be, and the same are hereby
repealed. 173
168 31 Tex. 362, 364 (1868).
189 Id. at 364.
170 Vol. I, Sayles' Early Laws of Texas, IX (1888).
171 TExAs ALMANAC 350 (1954-1955 ed.).
172 Act January 20, 1940, § 1.
'17 Id. § 2.
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The state of the law in Texas from 1840 to 1852 on riparian
rights generally and on irrigation rights in particular, is the first
problem presented. The common law of England during this
period appeared to be that:
Every owner of a riparian tenement on a natural watercourse flowing
in known and defined channel, whether on the surface of the land or
below it, or in an artificial channel of a permanent character, has as
an incident to his property in the riparian land a proprietory right to
have the water flow to him in its natural state in flow, quantity, and
quality, neither increased nor diminished, whether he has yet made use
of it or not.174
That state of the law has little appeal or utility in Texas, where,
if adhered to, it would provide our riparians with floods in sea-
sons of peak rainfall, with a water famine in the dry seasons,
and with a scenic river to admire in times of reasonable flow.
Some of the courts have paid some lip service to this statement
of the law,'75 but under the uniformly announced policy of our
courts to apply in Texas only so much of the common law of
England as is consistent with our institutions and will best serve
the interests of our people, 176 it is safe to assume that such has
never been the law of Texas. The rule of the common law above
quoted from Halsbury was not applied to prevent all diversions
in England prior to 1851, but before that date it had never been
decided that a riparian could divert any part of the waters of the
stream for irrigation. In the course of the oral argument in the
case of Embrey v. Owen, 77 Parke, Baron, remarked:
It has not yet been decided in this country that a riparian proprietor
has a right to take the water for the purpose of irrigating his land. 178
In this case the court held it was reasonable for the upper ri-
parian to divert small amounts of the water from the stream in
the season of plentiful flow for the purpose of fertilizing his pac-
174 33 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 593-594 (2d ed.).
175 "Without the consent of the adjoining proprietors, he (the riparian) cannot
divert or diminish the quantity of water which would otherwise descend to the proprie-
tors below..." Hass v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588, 590 (1856).
176 Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S. W. 2d 221, 224-225 (1936) ; Motl
v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 115, 286 S. W. 458 (1926) ; Clarendon Land Co. v. McClelland
Bros., 89 Tex. 433, 34 S. W. 98 (1896).
177 6 Exch. 353, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851).
178 Id. at 582.
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ture, the surplus being returned to the stream, and refused to
enjoin such practice at the suit of a lower mill operator whose
operations were concededly unaffected by the diversion.
So it seems safe to say that the common law of England on
riparian rights and irrigation between 1840 and 1852, being so
at variance with our irrigation history and practices, and so clearly
unsuited to our conditions, was not the law of Texas. In 1852
our Texas Legislature passed an irrigation law," 9 which, in its
broad outlines, appears to be in keeping with the law in Texas
prior to 1840 as this article has concluded it to have been. The
legislative tenor of irrigation law continued in that vein through-
out the period when most of our public lands were being granted.8
Thus it seems clear that to apply the common law of England to
grants made after 1852 would directly violate the specific con-
dition attached to the adoption of such common law that it was
to be the rule of decision only "until altered or repealed by Con-
gress."''
Under these circumstances what could be more reasonable and
proper than for our Texas courts independently, or in constru-
ing a statute to hold that the law of riparian rights on irrigation
were the same between 1840 and 1852 as they were prior to 1840,
and as our early legislature indicated them to be after 1852. Only
in that manner can we get correctly a reasonable consistency in
our law on the subject. If we construe grants before 1840 in ac-
cordance with the Spanish or Mexican law in effect at the time
of grant; the grants between 1840 and 1852 in accordance with
the common law of England before Embrey v. Owen, or even as
slightly relaxed by that decision, and revert to a consistency with
our legislative enactments after 1852 in construing grants after
that date, we will have an impractical patchwork of law applica-
ble along some of our main streams which will rival grandma's
quilt for variety. It is submitted that there is nothing in the his-
tory of the water law of Texas which requires such a result. In
fact it is believed that Texas, because of the limited and qualified
nature of riparian rights in this state, is substantially free to
179 Supra at 402.
180 Supra at 402-410.
181 Supra at 422.
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adopt whatever system of irrigation it elects.' If the conclusions
herein reached are correct concerning the qualified nature of the
riparian's rights, and the inherited power of the state government
over the waters of its streams, the state has the right to declare
its waters public subject only to perfected appropriations and the
rights of riparians to waters for domestic use. There is no doubt
that Texas did so by the Irrigation Act of 1889... and the adop-
tion in 1917 of Sec. 59a, Art. XVI of the Texas Constitution which
reads in part:
The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of
this state, including the control, storing, preservation and distribution
of its storm and flood waters, the waters of its rivers and streams, for
irrigation, power and all other useful purposes, the reclammation and
irrigation of its arid, semi-arid and other lands needing irrigation,
•.. and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources
of the state are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties;
and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate
thereto. (Emphasis added.)
It is confidently asserted that so long as Texas respects the
riparian's right to waters for domestic use and perfected appro-
priative rights, there is nothing the State of Texas cannot consti-
tutionally do with respect to the distribution of all the waters of
its streams so long as the action taken bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to the efficient and beneficial use of such waters.
If the conclusion of this paper that Mod v. Boyd is clearly
wrong on the origin and extent of riparian rights, and that the
true state of the law required a different conclusion, the question
still exists as to its status as a rule of property. Courts are more
reluctant to overrule a decision which announced a rule of prop-
erty than to overrule one of any other type. Still the policy against
doing so is not inflexible. The question is one of balancing inter-
ests. American Jurisprudence announces the issue thus:
While it is true that long acquiescence in an erroneous decision, so
that it has become a rule of property or practice, may raise it to the
dignity of law, thereby preventing the courts from overruling such a
decision wherein the rule established has become a rule of property
under which rights have been acquired and adjusted, yet it must not
182 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1906).
88 Supra at 407.
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be understood that a previous line of decisions affecting even property
rights can in no case be overthrown. Where the error of a previous
decision is recognized, but the rules therein have become rules of prop-
erty, the question whether the rule of stare decisis shall be adhered to
becomes a simple choice between relative evils. The rule should be
adhered to unless it appears that the evil resulting from the principle
established must be productive of greater mischief to the community
than can possibly ensue from disregarding the previous adjudications
upon the subject.184
Our own supreme court has indicated, though somewhat indi-
rectly, a similar position. It stated:
Bahn v. Starcke was decided nearly forty years ago, and, in so far as
we know, has neither been modified nor overruled. Many sessions of
the legislature have met since the decision, and the statutes have twice
been codified. Neither the statute law nor the constitutional provision
has been changed since the decision. In fact, it may be said that the
law as announced in Bahn v. Starcke has become a rule of property in
this state, and should not be changed in the absence of other controlling
circumstances, even though good reason might be given for a different
holding.'8 5 (Emphasis added.)
The case of Mot v. Boyd will now be examined in the light of
this pronouncement. If the conclusions of this paper are correct,
a fundamental weakness of the case as a precedent is that it is
wholly erroneous in its major conclusions on the origin, nature
and extent of riparian rights affecting Texas lands. A basically
wrong conclusion so vital to the public welfare of the state as a
whole, and affecting nonriparian lands as well as those riparian,
should ascend very slowly to the stature of an entrenched rule of
law. The subject matter of the case is strongly affected with a
public interest. The property of the public, its water, is involved.
So we are here concerned about more than a rule of property
affecting only the immediate private interests of the transactions
litigated.
The second major infirmity of this case on the points here un-
der discussion is that it was obiter dictum. This is true for two
reasons. First, the holding of the court on the point of estoppel l""
18 4 AM. JuR., Courts § 126 (1939).
185 Tanton et ux v. State National Bank of El Paso, Texas, et al, 125 Tex. 16,
79 S. W. 2d 833 (1935).
18 6 Supra at 379.
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was controlling regardless of the nature and extent of the riparian
interest, if any, owned at any time by the defendants. Conse-
quently a determination of the nature and extent of that interest
was wholly unnecessary to a decision of the case. The court could
have simply noted the arguments of counsel on those points and
have stated that it was unnecessary to decide the points raised,
since, if the interests of the defendants were conceded to be that
of the highest order of property ownership known to the law, it
was lost to them by the conduct of their predecessors in title giv-
ing rise to an estoppel against them.
This obiter dictum by the court on the origin, nature and extent
of riparian rights, was pronounced pursuant to issues raised, was
deliberate and the product of much study, but it was nevertheless
clearly unnecessary to a decision of the case.
Second, the conclusion was obiter dictum as to much of our
Texas lands because the conclusion of the court on the nature and
extent of riparian rights covered those lands beginning with the
earliest of Spanish grants through those of Coahuila and Texas and
Texas alone, including both those before and after 1840, whereas
the land involved in the Motl case was granted by the State of
Texas in 1857. This would seem to make obiter dictum everything
said with respect to lands granted at all times other than the period
of our water law history in which 1857 falls.8 7 This clearly would
be the period following 1852. Assuming the common law applied
during this period, which seems to be wholly inadmissible, the
court gave a very limited and inconclusive discussion of such
law as it existed in 1840 or on any date thereafter. After point-
ing out that the state made a limited adoption of the common law
of England as the rule of decision in 1840, the court observed:
Since all land sales subsequent to the adoption of the common law as
a rule of construction must be considered in the light of that adoption,
we deem it unnecessary to enter into a detailed analysis of the various
laws of the State authorizing grants or sales of land. 88 (Emphasis
added.)
There followed a brief analysis of some such land laws of
187 The following distinct periods can be identified: 1. Spanish Civil law as admin-
istered in the New World until 1821; 2. Law of Mexico from 1821 to 1840; 3. Law of
Texas from 1840 to 1852; and 4. The law of Texas after 1852.
188 Motl v. Boyd, 116 Texas 82, 106.
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Texas the earliest of which was 1877.89 No discussion was had
of the common law of England in 1840 or at any time thereafter,
or of the irrigation statutes of Texas, beginning in 1852, which
were clearly more pertinent to the state of the law in 1857 than
of those dealing with the sale of public lands enacted in 1877
and thereafter.' 90
The constitutional and statutory setting in which the case was
decided detracts from the strength of the decision and lessens
the basis for a claim to continue it as a rule of property law.
The pre-Motl v. Boyd irrigation statutes involved were analyzed
earlier,' 91 and what was said there will not be repeated. It is
sufficient to recall that the whole legislative history on irrigation
beginning in 1852 and continuing through 1926, when the case
was decided, was hostile in varying degrees to the conclusions
reached on riparian rights. This legislative policy reached its
zenith when it was enacted that no riparian rights would be con-
strued to attach to lands granted by the state subsequent to July 1,
1895.192 It also seems that the concept of a vested property right
to water for irrigating that is neither acquired by use nor lost by
disuse throughout the ages is wholly inconsistent with the phi.
losophy embodied in the above quoted sec. 59A of Art. XVI of
the state constitution, adopted by the people in 1917.'
While our supreme court should follow, and on the whole has
followed, its decisions tending to establish rules of property, it
has not always done so. Examples of such failure can be found
in the general area of water law. In construing what is now Art.
5302 of our civil statutes,9 . the supreme court, in City of Austin
v. Hall, 95 clearly held that the riparian under the statute owned
to the edge of the stream of water contained in the river bed. In
1s9 Ibid.
190 See supra at 380-381 for a discussion of the lack of significance of the latter statutes.
191 Supra at
192 Acts 1913 § 97.
193 Supra at 425.
104 "All lands surveyed for individuals, lying on navigable water courses, shall front
one-half of the square on the water course and the line running at right angles with the
general course of the stream, if circumstances of the lines previously surveyed under the
laws will permit. All streams so far as they retain an average width of thirty feet from
the mouth up shall be considered navigable streams within the meaning hereof, and they
shall not be crossed by the lines of any survey. All surveys not made upon navigable
water courses shall be in a square, so far as lines previously surveyed will permit."
Acts 1837, at 63; Pasch. Dig. 4529, G. L. vol. 1, at 1405.
195 93 Tex. 591, 57 S. W. 563, 564, 565 (1900).
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so far as the decision could do so, it vested in riparians the land
to the water's edge. That decision stood until the Motl case, a
period of 26 years, at which time all owners of lands in the state
riparian to streams to which the statute was applicable, were
"divested" of the lands between the water's edge and the bank,
as defined in the Motl case,'96 and an easement over such lands
was substituted therefor.'97 There was not so much as a mention
of the Hall case. There is strong indication that such reversal of
position was not inadvertent, however. In Diversion Lake Club
v. R. W. Heath et al,' it was noted in an opinion by the commis-
sion of appeals that it was held in the Hall case... that the riparian
on a navigable stream owned to "the water line of such stream"
200
but that in Motl v. Boyd "the court deliberately adopted" a posi-
tion which restricted his ownership to the bank as therein de-
fined.2 "' This opinion was adopted by the supreme court. Chief
Justice Cureton, who wrote the opinion in the Motl case, was chief
justice when the Diversion Club Lake opinion was adopted.
Again, the supreme court in Tolle v. Correth,20 ' and Mud Creek
Irrigation, Agricultural and Manufacturing Company v. Chas.
Vivian et al,"'3 concluded that irrigation was a natural use and
that a riparian could use all the waters of his adjoining stream
without regard to the needs of other riparians for a similar pur-
pose. In 1905, 37 years after the Vivian case and during which
time much public land was granted by the state, the supreme court
held in Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 4 that irrigation was not
a natural use and thus "divested" such right as the riparians had
acquired under the rule of the prior cases. If we say that the state-
196 "So when the statute says that the average width shall be 30 feet between the
banks, it does not mean the space covered by the water at a low tide or flow, but the
entire bed of the stream as above defined. The fact that at times and places there may
be some distance between the bordering banks which limit the survey lines, and the
water does not militate against the right of the riparian owner to have access to the
water. When the riparian rights were granted, they carried therewith the right to use
the water, and this is adequate to give access to it at all stages." Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex.
82, 109, 286 S. W. 458, 467, 468 (1926).
197 Ibid.
198 126 Tex. 129, 86 S. W. 2d 441 (1935).
199 Supra note 195.
200 126 Tex. at 140, 86 S. W. 2d at 446.
201 Ibid.
202 31 Tex. 362 (1868).
2 03 74 Tex. 170 (1889).
204 98 Tex. 578, 86 S. W. 733.
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ments in the Tolle and Vivian cases were both erroneous and
dictum, we do not alter matters since what was said in Mot v,
Boyd here under consideration was erroneous and also dictum
for more than one sufficient reason.20 5
And finally there is the case of Miller et al v. Letzerich et al.,2'
the opinion in which may be a two edged sword. As early as,
1889, the Texas Supreme Court in Gross v. City of Lampasas,"7
adopted the "common enemy" doctrine as applied to surface
waters. This doctrine was reaffirmed in Barnett v. Matagorda Rice-
and Irrigation Company,"' and was later followed in eleverr
cases decided by various courts of civil appeals as to five of which
the supreme court denied writs of error.20 9 This doctrine unques-
tionably creates a servitude over the upgrade estate in favor
of the downgrade estate. But the legislature in 1915 enacted a
statute210 making it unlawful to divert surface waters by unnatural
means onto the land of another so as to cause damage. The su-
preme court in the Letzerich case 211 upheld the statute, and took
the opportunity to state that the earlier cases were erroneous.2
The decision either means that an erroneous decision involving
a rule of real property vests no interest at all or that it does not
vest one which the legislature cannot take away in the reasonable
exercise of the police power. Under this doctrine such rights, if
any, as have "vested" under the Mot doctrine, if the dictum in
that case is erroneous as it is believed to be, are subject to revision
or abolition by legislative enactment or by judicial correction.
The authors, while entertaining convictions based upon the
work done by them, do not contend that they have exhausted the
research possibilities in this area. The work done has impressed
us, however, with how incomplete has been the research done
heretofore. Research and study trips to Spain, Mexico, and fur-
ther study in the Spanish Archives dealing with the Nacogdoches
settlement and the San Antonio and Ysleta irrigation systema
205 Supra at 427-428.
206 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W. 2d 404 (1932).
207 74 Tex. 195, 11 S. W. 1086.
208 98 Tex. 355, 83 S. W. 801 (1904).
209 See Miller et al v. Letzerich et al, 121 Tex. 248, 262, 49 S. W. 2d 404, 411 (1932).
210 Now TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. Art. 7589 (1925). This statute after being passed in
1915 was omitted from the codification of 1925 but was reenacted in 1927.
211 Supra note 209.
212 Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 262-263; 49 S. W. 2d 404, 412 (1932).
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should be rewarding. The strength of our convictions has come
primarily from the singleness of direction in which the results
,of our research have pointed and the basic good sense of the
indicated irrigation law for the countries out of which our irriga-
tion law came, and for our own state to which it is now to be
applied. Perhaps it would be helpful to summarize our major
conclusions. They are:
1. That the relation of our public lands to a natural water-
course had essentially nothing to do with whether or not it was
'classified as "irrigable" or as having the "facilities of irrigation"
at the time it was granted.
2. That being on an irrigation ditch was of much importance
if not controlling.
3. That whether land was "irrigable" or had "facilities of
irrigation" was an issue of fact pure and simple to be determined
in the light of all the facts and circumstances. Location on a river
was only one of those facts and apparently of little importance
in producing an affirmative answer. It was not a legal conclusion
following automatically from the one fact that the land bordered
-on a stream.
4. That under Spanish and Mexican law, the riparian had a
position of substantial value including the valuable rights of
accretion, avulsion, and probably to the use of riparian waters
for domestic purposes. His location also gave him a valuable
advantage of access to the watercourse for the purpose of fishing,
navigating, running a mill, and even for irrigating his farm.
There is no persuasive authority or practice, however, to support
the position that he had a vested property right to the waters of
adjoining streams for irrigation, independent of established and
recognized use, superior to that of anyone else who could legally
obtain access thereto, or superior to the power of the state to
give such access and to regulate the distribution of its public
waters as it concluded to be in the public interest.
5. That the use of such terms as "irrigable" and with the "fa-
cilities of irrigation" in the classification provisions of the Span-
ish and Coahuila and Texas colonization laws, was solely for the
purpose of determining the price to be paid the government and
had nothing to do with the creation or conveyance of a vested
1955]
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property interest in the sense we have come to know the term.21s
6. That the conclusion of the court in Motl v. Boyd "That all
grantees of public lands became vested, by reason of the lands
granted, with riparian rights to the waters of the streams.., not
only for his (their) domestic and household use but for irriga-
tion as well''214 is not only unsupported by the authorities and
practices above detailed, but is overwhelmingly refuted by them.
7. That the conclusion reached in Motl v. Boyd on the nature
of the riparian right is not only erroneous but is dictum.
8. That the subject matter of the suit was the statutorily de-
clared public waters of the state, but that the case was decided
without the state, the appropriate representative of the public,
being a party to the suit.
9. That while the case on the point involved has necessarily
acquired some stature as a rule of property, it has no more than
should be accorded to a twenty-nine year old pronouncement of
erroneous dictum made in a case of great public interest having
a defect of parties.
Thus the flow from Motl v. Boyd is judicial uncertainty as to
the status of water law in Texas, and legislative uncertainty as
to what can be done to provide for the harnessing of our restless
and ever moving water supply to provide for its greatest utiliza-
tion, and, in turn, for our greatest statewide prosperity. It is
believed that this flow rests upon an underflow of erroneous legal
and historical doctrine which should never have existed, but which
the legislature has full, complete and adequate power to revise
and the courts to correct. It seems incredible that the laws con-
trolling the utilization of our water, a natural resource with bil-
2 1 There is substantial evidence to support this position. The grant to Stephen F.
Austin of record in Vol. 2, at 608 of the Spanish Archives, General Land Office, State
of Texas, contains no classification. This was probably due to the fact that Art. 22 of
the Texas and Coahuila colonization law of March 24, 1825, under which Austin's
Grant was made, exempted empresarios, of which Austin was one, from paying for
their lands. If the classification had been significant in determining the nature of the
property right obtained by Austin, it would have been necessary to classify the land
though no payment was to be made. And in the proceedings recorded in Book A. at
33-41, Deed Records, Colorado County, Texas, by which Henry Austin obtained some
lands along the Colorado River, an official was instructed as to "classifying at first their
quality for the price he must pay the state," and it was determined as to some lands
along the river that "they belong to the class of arable land 131 labores to that of pas-
tures which will serve to classify it for the price he must pay for them to the State
according to Article 22 of said law.. ."
214 Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S. W. 458 (1926).
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lions of dollars of potential, is to be forever restricted by the
simple, prosaic, workaday fact that our early courts did not have
before them all of the applicable law and the facts necessary for
its interpretation. To adhere to stare decisis under all the circum-
stances surrounding this case is not to honor that doctrine-it is
to make a fetish of it.
